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I. INTRODUCTION
Competition policy is a work in progress. Since the late 19th century, the history of
competition law has featured a continuing search for optimal statutory commands,
institutional designs, and operational techniques.1 Recent decades have witnessed
extraordinary change as existing competition systems seek better practices for defining
substantive commands, setting priorities, choosing cases, and selecting remedies. This
Article suggests that charting the future course of competition policy can benefit heavily
from looking back and asking two fundamental questions. First, did the agency’s
interventions produce good results? Second, did the agency’s managerial processes help
ensure that the agency selected initiatives that would yield good outcomes? By assessing
the quality of its substantive interventions and internal procedures, a public agency can
gain valuable insights about how to improve its performance. Even the effort to define
performance measures can impose valuable discipline on an agency’s allocation of
resources and help identify possibilities for improvement.
Encouraging government bodies to conduct performance evaluations is not only
good public policy, it is likely to be a key ingredient of future attempts by competition
authorities to demonstrate the value of competition law to broader audiences. In existing
competition systems, as well as in jurisdictions considering the adoption of a competition
law, a number of observers decline to assume as a matter of theory, or accept as an article
of faith, that the enforcement of a competition law yields socially useful results. An a
priori presumption of efficacy is a weak substitute for a systematic assessment of
outcomes.2
This Article discusses how government competition authorities might use ex post
evaluations of enforcement decisions, operational mechanisms, and organizational design
to improve the quality of their work. The Article examines the value of ex post analyses
of previous public enforcement actions as follows. Part II describes two basic forms of
performance measurement that competition agencies might undertake to improve the
quality of their work. Part III identifies the rationales for establishing and applying
performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of the substantive interventions and
operational procedures of competition policy agencies. Part IV discusses the past
experience of competition agencies in conducting ex post analyses of substantive outputs
and operational procedures. Although not a comprehensive account of agency experience,
Part IV uses noteworthy examples to provide a context for the proposals in Part V that
present methodologies for performing evaluations.

1. JONATHAN BAKER, ANDREW I. GAVIL & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE:
CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 923-30 (2002).
2. See Robert Pitofsky, Roundtable Conference with Enforcement Officials, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 581, 59395 (2000) (Phillip A. Proger, Moderator) (stating that “unexamined enforcement policy is not an appropriate
way to proceed” and observing that antitrust agencies “virtually have an obligation, not just to enforce the law,
but to take a look at the consequences of [their] enforcement”).

[KOVACIC] FINAL

506

8/17/2006 10:14:45 AM

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Winter

II. THE EVALUATION OF COMPETITION AGENCIES: TWO FORMS OF PERFORMANCE
MEASUREMENT
This Article addresses two basic ways that competition agencies can measure the
quality of their performance. The first is to evaluate the contribution of the agency’s
outputs, such as the prosecution of cases or the commitment of resources to competition
advocacy, to the attainment of the goals embodied in the jurisdiction’s competition laws.
Suppose, for example, that the jurisdiction’s competition law seeks to improve economic
performance by proscribing anticompetitive mergers, improper exclusion by dominant
firms, or naked agreements among rivals to set prices or other terms of trade. An
outcome-oriented program of evaluation would seek to determine how much the agency’s
pursuit of specific initiatives helped achieve these ends.
A second approach to evaluation focuses on process. In lieu of, or in addition to,
evaluating outcomes, an evaluation program might seek to assess the quality of the
competition agency’s internal operations—the mix of managerial methods and
organizational choices that determine how the agency allocates and applies its resources.
This approach treats management and organization as critical inputs into the
implementation of competition policy and seeks to identify improvements in how the
competition agency operates. The logic is that progress toward superior managerial and
organizational techniques will increase the likelihood that the agency’s substantive
outputs generally promote the realization of the competition law’s objectives.
In striving to cope with the crisis of the moment or the press of new business, public
(and private) institutions might be tempted to regard performance evaluation as a purely
optional and discretionary undertaking. The need for a competition agency to address
current exigencies—for example, to cope with an unusually large number of merger
filings—can encourage acceptance of the view that the expenditure of effort to evaluate
substantive outputs or managerial inputs is an unaffordable luxury or a costly “diversion”
of resources away from the treatment of immediate operational needs. In this frame of
mind, an agency’s managers may reason that they can either support current operations
or conduct ex post assessments, but not both.
To perceive that performance measurement comes at the expense of fulfilling
current operational obligations misconceives the role of evaluation. As a large and
growing literature demonstrates, performance measurement is a necessary ingredient of
good practice for public institutions.3 From this perspective, strong mechanisms for
evaluating outcomes and decisionmaking processes are not detached from, but instead are
integral to, the creation of sound policy outputs.4 Outlays for performance measurement
by a public institution are no more “discretionary” than the effort that physicians exert
after performing surgery to meet with their patients and determine whether the surgery
improved the patient’s health.
3. See JODY ZALL KUSEK & RAY C. RIST, TEN STEPS TO A RESULTS-BASED MONITORING AND
EVALUATION SYSTEM 12-22 (2004) (discussing the importance of results-oriented evaluation to effective public
administration); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 373-75 (1989) (describing the policy benefits of having
government bodies evaluate the results of their programs).
4. See, e.g., Deborah Platt Majoras, Remarks Before the Charles River Associates: A Dose of Our Own
Medicine: Applying a Cost/Benefit Analysis to the FTC’s Advocacy Program 3 (Feb. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050208currebttopics.pdf.

[KOVACIC] FINAL

2006]

8/17/2006 10:14:45 AM

Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve Competition Policy Authorities

507

Properly understood, performance measurement is not an institutional burden but
instead is a valuable asset. It enables an agency to tap its base of experience and borrow
from the experience of peer institutions to improve the quality of its work. A routine of
retrospective assessments can help agency managers engage in what two scholars of
public administration, Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, have called “thinking in time
streams,” which is applying “the kind of mental ability that readily connects discrete
phenomena over time and repeatedly checks connections.”5 Robust performance
measurement tools can help answer the three fundamental questions that Neustadt and
May have identified as the core concerns of public agency decisionmaking: “‘Will it
work?’ ‘Will it stick?’ ‘Will it help more than it hurts?’”6
As noted above, two important focal points for ex post evaluation are the substantive
outputs of the competition agency (cases and advocacy interventions) and the operational
processes (strategic planning and case handling) that generate such outputs. The literature
on performance evaluation notes the tendency of public and private institutions to
conduct detailed ex post assessments solely or largely as a desperate and necessary
response to an operational calamity. Such evaluations unmistakably play a valuable role
in improving agency performance in the short and long term. For example, a detailed
reconstruction and analysis of a serious operational failure can identify weaknesses in
specific substantive projects or in an institution’s decisionmaking processes, and can
foster adjustments in the institution’s projects or the establishment of formal rules and
cultural norms that reduce the possibility of future disasters.7
A custom of conducting ex post assessments only in response to grave operational
failures is a seriously incomplete form of performance measurement. A superior approach
is to examine programs on an ongoing basis and not simply in response to dramatic
failures. A well conceived evaluation mechanism would study programs that appear, at
any single moment, to be working well. Such initiatives can serve to identify possible
improvements that will make an acceptable or commendable program truly excellent.
From a more defensive perspective, a routine of unflinching assessment can spot flaws
that, if uncorrected, could lead to a major policy breakdown. When success is achieved
by narrow margins or gained by sheer luck, an organization may overestimate its skill
and shave the margin of error to a dangerous thinness that eventually begets failure. To
make no effort to assess outcomes and the causes of outcomes is a form of flying blind.8

5. RICHARD NEUSTADT & ERNEST MAY, THINKING IN TIME 252-53 (1986). Professors Neustadt and May
observe that this type of thinking “is a special style of approaching choices, more the planner’s or the long-term
program manager’s than the lawyer’s or judge’s or consultant’s or trouble-shooter’s.” Id.
6. Id. at 270.
7. One example is the effort by De Havilland to determine the cause of crashes of the world’s first
commercial jet airliner, the Comet, in the early 1950s. RAY WILLIAMS, IMAGES OF AVIATION: COMET AND
NIMROD 15-16 (2000). De Havilland conducted extensive research on a Comet in its inventory, identified a
latent design flaw that caused the crashes, and made the results of its research available to the world’s aviation
community. Id. De Havilland’s work in identifying the cause of the disasters and in publicizing the results of his
evaluation facilitated significant improvements in the design of commercial jet transports. Id.
8. In his recent analysis of the business practices of a professional sport league, Michael Lewis quotes
one observer who captures the problems of an organization that cannot, or will not, develop good measures of
performance: “[The sport franchise executives] aren’t equipped to evaluate their own systems. They don’t have
the mechanism to let in the good and get rid of the bad. They either keep everything or get rid of everything,
and they rarely do the latter.” MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL 241 (2004).
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Few institutions, public or private, enjoy subjecting themselves to rigorous
assessments of their work. Good performance measures can be hard to design, and the
cost and indeterminacy of trying to formulate truly informative measures can be
daunting. When pressed to devise performance measures, some institutions have
embraced badly flawed criteria simply because the activities they chose to observe were
measurable—an approach no less delusional than disdaining all measurement until the
roof caves in. Ask the wrong questions, and you can get spurious answers.
Selecting good performance measures unquestionably can be a difficult task, and the
worth of an evaluation exercise depends heavily on the validity of the chosen criteria. At
the same time, one should be skeptical of claims that a given activity is so resistant to
measurement that one must rely entirely upon the actor’s untested (and, the actor might
say, untestable) representations about the quality of the actor’s work. Even if
measurement problems are significant and turn out to be overwhelming, the very process
of seeking to define what constitutes good performance can add rigor to an institution’s
decisions about what it should do. Among other results, the effort to define good
performance can press an institution to improve its classification and tracking of
programmatic inputs and outputs.
The apprehension about performance measurement goes beyond problems
associated with choosing the correct yardstick. Even if supplied a perfect methodology,
some institutions might shrink from applying it. On a good day, an evaluation can show
that an institution’s actions or processes had good consequences. On a bad day, the
evaluation can reveal harmful effects, or no consequences at all. An institution might
perceive that two of these three outcomes, no effects or bad effects, will be unflattering,
and it may lack confidence that an ex post assessment will uncover good results. These
anxieties may be understandable, but few objective observers would regard such fears as
reasonable grounds to forgo performance measurement. If the institution’s discomfort
with conducting evaluations is based on a strong sense that rigorous measurement will
reveal serious error, that, by itself, is reason for an institution to perform such
assessments.
III. THE RATIONALE FOR EX POST EVALUATION IN MAKING COMPETITION POLICY
A number of rationales support the commitment of resources by competition
agencies to develop and apply performance measures to evaluate substantive
interventions and operational procedures. These rationales go beyond the general
considerations of sound public administration described above in Part II. The need for
performance measurement in competition policy stems from both the distinctive qualities
of competition policy as a form of government regulation and from modern institutional
developments within and across jurisdictions with competition laws.
A. Uncertainty: Competition Policy as Experimentation
The formulation of competition policy frequently requires antitrust authorities to
make difficult judgments amid uncertainty about the competitive significance of business
conduct.9 Will a merger retard or increase competition? Are the business justifications
9. Ken Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
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offered to support a refusal to deal or an exclusive contract genuine or contrived? These
and other decisions can be difficult even in “routine” matters, and they can be especially
challenging when rapid technological change, deregulation, or other dynamic forces
complicate the analysis of competitive effects.10
Making policy amid uncertainty gives a substantial experimental element to
government enforcement. Enforcement decisions can be viewed as experiments in which
public authorities test the efficacy of different hypotheses about business behavior.11
Over time, antitrust agencies reach a policy equilibrium by expanding and contracting the
zone of enforcement. Testing the validity of different hypotheses involves making
enforcement decisions that take chances with either intervening too aggressively or not
intervening enough. Without experiments that sometimes intervene too much or
sometimes intervene too little, it would be impossible for enforcement authorities to
determine the correct mix of policies.12
The role of experimentation in competition policy is evident in the development in
the United States since the 1930s of a policy against cartels. The story of modern U.S.
anticartel policy can be told as a series of interrelated experiments with initiatives that
primarily sought to increase the rate of detection for collusive schemes and to boost the
punishments for violators.13 The enhancement by the Department of Justice (DOJ) of its
leniency program in 1993 and 1994 is perhaps the best known and most widely emulated
of these experiments.14 The successes in the past decade of high-powered leniency
programs in eliciting the revelation of illegal cartels have obscured the skepticism within
and without the DOJ that accompanied the reforms of the early 1990s. The only way to
know whether a policy of stronger assurances about immunity from criminal prosecution
would attract more disclosures was to try it out. It was not self-evident at the time that the
program would make a genuine difference.
The importance of uncertainty and the experimental quality of competition policy is
apparent in several dimensions of government decisionmaking. One analytical exercise
that vividly underscores the uncertainty related difficulties of diagnosing past behavior or
375, 375 (2005).
10. See William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and
International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805, 825-39 (2001) (reviewing how the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the competition directorate of the European Commission analyzed the likely
competitive effects of Boeing’s acquisition of McDonnell Douglas amid conditions of technological dynamism
and regulatory complexity).
11. See generally William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments: Using Ex Post Assessments of
Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition Policy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 843 (2001)
(discussing the experimental features of competition policy).
12. See William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 472-76 (2003) (emphasizing the cumulative nature of competition policymaking and the
importance of experimentation as a source of learning for competition authorities).
13. See id. at 416-25; Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust, in POST CHICAGO
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW (Antonio Cucinotta et al. eds., 2002) (discussing how economic learning is
absorbed into antitrust jurisprudence and enforcement policy).
14. The experimentation did not come to rest with the leniency reforms of the 1990s; it continues at a
robust pace in many jurisdictions today. See, e.g., R. Hewitt Pate, Current Issues in International Antitrust
Enforcement, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY (Barry Hawk ed., 2005) (discussing the rationale
for U.S. reforms in 2004 that increased maximum criminal fines for Sherman Act violations and provided
partial dispensation from treble damages for certain leniency applicants).
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predicting the impact of proposed transactions is the formulation of remedies.15 In
negotiating settlements or preparing a request for relief in a case, competition agency
officials often must make problematic judgments about which remedies will resolve
competitive problems. The choice of cures in any specific case—for example, imposing
limits on conduct to remedy an abuse of dominance—to some degree inevitably involves
experimentation.16 As much as any element of competition policy, the selection of
remedies calls for efforts to examine and learn from past experience as a guide to future
decisions.
In the sciences, an indispensable element of the process of experimentation is the
systematic evaluation of the experiment’s results; so it should be with experimentation in
competition policy. Without ex post testing, it will rarely be possible to determine
whether the assumptions and hypotheses that motivated a competition agency’s decision
to prosecute were sound. Ex post assessments can also reduce the uncertainty associated
with future decisions by illuminating how well various theories diagnose business
conduct or predict competitive effects, and by informing judgments about the impact of
various remedies.
B. Limited Transparency: The Impact of Policymaking by Settlement
A widely accepted principle of public administration is that government authorities
should make the rationale for public policies and the processes for establishing such
policies transparent. Transparency promotes clarity in forming public competition policy,
increases the understanding of legal commands by affected parties, and disciplines the
exercise of discretion by public officials by subjecting their actions to external review
and criticism.17 Transparent policymaking methods that inform external observers
(especially business operators) about the content of, and rationale for, specific decisions
help ensure the regularity and honesty of public administration.18 Common transparency
enhancing measures include publishing decisions in law enforcement matters, issuing
guidelines, and using speeches to articulate the basis for specific initiatives.
The enforcement of competition laws relies significantly upon settlements.19 One

15. See William E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies for Dominant Firm Misconduct, 31 CONN. L.
REV. 1285, 1314 (2000) (describing how technological dynamism complicates the design of antitrust remedies).
16. In his discussion of the remedy accepted by the FTC in 1975 to resolve its monopolization case against
Xerox, Willard Tom uses the language of experimentation. Willard K. Tom, The 1975 Xerox Consent Decree:
Ancient Artifacts and Current Tensions, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 967, 979 (2001). After recounting the origin of the
remedy, Tom asks: “What are we to make of this naked, but apparently highly successful, experiment in social
engineering?” Id.
17. See Mark A. Dutz & Shyam A. Khemani, Instruments of Competition Policy and Their Relevance for
Economic Development, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 28 (Claudio
R. Frischtak ed., 1995) (emphasizing the importance of transparent decisionmaking processes in formulating
competition policy).
18. Weak transparency regimes can undermine the quality of public administration. See Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Knowledge for Development: Economic Science, Economic Policy, and Economic Advice, in ANNUAL WORLD
BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 9 (Boris Pleskovic & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 1999)
(“Governments in many countries have a strong proclivity for secrecy. . . . Secrecy provides more scope for the
work of special interest groups, greater cover for corruption, and greater opportunities for hiding mistakes.”).
19. See Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust
Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1408-17 (1998) (discussing how U.S. enforcement agencies often use
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important source of this development is the establishment of mandatory notification
mechanisms and waiting periods for merger control.20 Premerger notification systems
have expanded recourse to settlements involving divestitures or conduct-related
undertakings to resolve competitive concerns with individual transactions.
In the typical settlement, it may be difficult for those other than the parties to the
negotiations to accurately assess the basis for or significance of the settlement. In
announcing settlements, the official statements of competition agencies tend to favorably
portray the enforcement agency’s decision to prosecute and its resolution of the matter. In
their formal public pronouncements, competition agencies ordinarily do not express
doubts about whether the solution contained in the settlement will cure apparent
competition problems with the transaction. In the hospital of public competition law
enforcement, surgeries usually are portrayed as successes.
One way to address transparency problems associated with using settlements to
resolve government competition cases is to adopt policies that commit the competition
agency to undertake periodic ex post assessments to evaluate the soundness of the
decisionmaking process and to consider the effects of substantive interventions such as
settlements. The performance of ex post evaluations, either by the competition agency
itself or by outsiders with the competition agency’s cooperation, and the publication of
results would help determine the value of specific remedies.
C. The Evolutionary Quality of Antitrust Jurisprudence and Enforcement Policy
The development of competition policy is inherently evolutionary.21 In some
jurisdictions, the evolutionary character stems partly from the institutional design of the
competition policy system. In adopting the principal U.S. antitrust laws, for example,
Congress created general statutory commands and gave the federal courts responsibility
for interpreting their operative terms and adjusting the content of doctrine over time.22
The U.S. courts have recognized that fulfilling their assigned role in this consciously
evolutionary scheme requires an awareness of how past interpretations of the antitrust
laws have affected commerce.23
A more universal source of competition policy’s evolutionary nature is its
interdisciplinary foundation. In antitrust practice, economic analysis plays a central role
in resolving such key antitrust issues as delineating the relevant market and assessing the
efficiency consequences of various forms of business behavior.24 Economics is a
settlements to resolve antitrust concerns).
20. See William Blumenthal, Overenforcement in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Second Request Process, in THE
ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 15 (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit eds., 1996) (describing the
U.S. system for notification and review of proposed mergers).
21. See Melanie Johnson, Keynote Speech, in 2 CURRENT COMPETITION LAW 3, 7 (Mads Andenas et al.
eds., 2004); see generally Kovacic, supra note 12 (describing how history-based narratives have informed
federal antitrust policy).
22. See William E. Kovacic, The Influence of Economics on Antitrust Law, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 294 (1992)
(describing congressional delegation of interpretational authority to the courts in the U.S. antitrust laws).
23. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (describing the Supreme Court’s distinctive role
under the antitrust laws “in recognizing and adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated
experience”).
24. See Baker, supra note 13, at 60-76 (discussing how economic learning is absorbed into antitrust
jurisprudence and enforcement policy); see also William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A
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dynamic discipline, and the history of industrial organization economics has featured
considerable change and refinement in the understanding of commercial phenomena.25
Changes in economic learning can alter antitrust legal doctrines that are informed by
economic insights. Empirical research, including the analysis of past antitrust cases, has
supplied a major impetus for the development of new industrial organization ideas and an
important stimulus for alterations in antitrust doctrine and enforcement policy.26
D. Institutional Multiplicity: Concurrent Oversight
The modern competition policy environment features numerous public and private
actors with authority to enforce antitrust commands. Multiplicity has a significant
international dimension and, in some jurisdictions, an important domestic element.
Globally, the development of new competition policy systems and the enhancement of
older regimes have meant that individual mergers or other forms of commercial activity
are likely to attract attention from a variety of national or regional competition bodies.27
In some jurisdictions, such as Brazil, France, and the United States, responsibility for
formulating and executing competition policy is shared by two or more public
competition authorities.28 In many jurisdictions, the public competition authorities also
share authority with sectoral regulators to scrutinize mergers or other forms of conduct.29
The slow but continuing development of private rights of action in jurisdictions that
previously had relied solely upon public enforcement provides for still further
Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000) (describing the influence of economic
analysis on the development of legal antitrust doctrines in the United States since 1890).
25. See Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal—Why
Aspen and Kodak are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659, 680 (2001) (“[A]s the literature in economics shows,
economists often take decades to understand certain business practices.”).
26. See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 15-18 (reviewing how “a considerable body of scholarship discussing the
effects of vertical restraints” influenced judicial reassessment of the per se ban on maximum resale price
maintenance); see also Timothy J. Muris, GTE Sylvania and the Empirical Foundations of Antitrust, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 903-07 (2001) (describing the impact of developments in industrial organization
economics on merger enforcement policy).
27. See Symposium, International Merger Control, ANTITRUST MAG., Spring 2001 (reviewing
developments in merger control in various national jurisdictions); William E. Kovacic, Merger Enforcement in
Transition: Antitrust Controls on Acquisitions in Emerging Economies, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1075 (1998)
(examining opportunities for multiple review of mergers resulting from the growth in the number of
competition policy systems in transition economies).
28. The decentralization of prosecutorial authority across public and private entities in the United States is
unmatched. See William E. Kovacic, Toward a Domestic Competition Network, in COMPETITION LAWS IN
CONFLICT 316 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004).
29. See William J. Kolasky, The FCC’s Review of the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX and SBC/Ameritech Mergers:
Regulation Overreach in the Nature of Promoting Competition, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 771 (2001) (describing
parallel review by the DOJ and Federal Communications Commission of mergers in the telecommunications
sector). In a number of jurisdictions, government regulatory bodies not ordinarily considered to have a
competition policy portfolio make decisions that significantly influence the competitive process and affect, at
least indirectly, the programs of public competition authorities. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (discussing how the U.S. process for granting patent rights can
affect competition); William E. Kovacic & Andreas Reindl, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Improving
Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Policy, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1062 (2005) (discussing how
decisions of institutions that grant intellectual property rights can have a major impact on competition).
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decentralization of prosecutorial authority.
The fragmentation of policymaking authority requires business managers to account
for a wide array of substantive competition policy commands and varied interpretations
of the same commands by different public enforcement bodies. In recent years a number
of observers have drawn attention to complications that arise when individual episodes of
business behavior are subject to numerous parallel enforcement efforts within and across
jurisdictions. Most attention has focused on the possibility that multiple reviews of
mergers by national competition authorities can unduly raise the cost of executing such
transactions.30 An emerging area of concern is the extent to which diverse remedial
schemes interact in the prosecution of specific instances of misconduct. Ex post studies of
specific enforcement episodes would assist in clarifying the impact of having numerous
public antitrust authorities examine the same business conduct and informing debate
about possible adjustments.
E. Institutional Multiplicity: Benchmarking Operational Processes
For all of the complexity it introduces into business planning and interagency
coordination, the development of new competition systems and the reform of existing
systems have created numerous opportunities for competition authorities in one
jurisdiction to benchmark their operational procedures with their counterparts. There is
considerable variation in the manner in which individual authorities organize their
institutions into operational units, devise strategies, and allocate resources. The
diversification in approaches provides numerous comparative yardsticks by which an
agency can evaluate the soundness of its own organizational choices and procedures.
Among other possibilities, comparative study supplies a basis for a competition
agency to decide how to establish internal quality control—for example, by establishing
an independent unit of economists with authority to report directly to the agency
leadership or by creating “devil’s advocate” panels to test the assumptions and evidence
of agency case handlers. As suggested below, diversification also has supplied models for
agencies to consider in building their own measures of performance and conducting ex
post performance reviews.
F. The Value of Competition Agency Participation in Performance Management
Competition agencies are not the only possible source of performance assessments
of competition policy. Researchers have created a substantial body of literature that
analyzes specific cases, enforcement programs, or procedures without participation by or
cooperation from the government agencies responsible for the matters in question.31 In a

30. See INT’L COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMM., ANTITRUST DIV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL
REPORT 3-18 (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm (summarizing possible costs
associated with multiple reviews of individual transactions conducted by national competition authorities and
by different competition bodies within a single country).
31. For a representative collection of papers examining the outcomes of specific cases, see Symposium,
Antitrust at the Millennium (Part I), 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2000); and Symposium, Antitrust at the Millennium
(Part II), 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 621 (2001). See also JOHN FINGLETON ET AL., COMPETITION POLICY AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE (1995) (written by researchers who enjoyed extensive access to the
competition agencies and who examined in detail the enforcement programs in several nations in Central
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number of instances, such assessments have influenced antitrust policy by changing the
views of enforcement officials and courts about the validity of certain doctrines or
enforcement practices.32 Government bodies outside the competition agency, such as
entities entrusted with audit responsibilities, also have conducted performance
assessments.33 In recent years, government bodies such as Canada’s International
Development Research Centre (IDRC) have funded projects to encourage local
researchers in transition economies to evaluate the actual effects of competition law
enforcement and to identify barriers to competition.34
As these examples suggest, a competition policy system might rely solely on the
initiative of researchers or institutions other than the competition authority to obtain ex
post assessments of individual cases or enforcement programs without the participation
of the competition agency. Several considerations indicate the importance of formal
participation by the competition agencies. The competition agency is likely to be the
main repository of information about the decision to prosecute and about internal
deliberations concerning the management of individual cases. The competition authority
also may have a unique capability to collect information relating to the effects of
enforcement programs.35
The most important factor favoring performance measurement within the
competition agency is the likelihood that a routine of evaluation will have a greater effect
in promoting regular and timely adjustments in the agency’s practice. One ideally would
prefer to have the competition agency actively seek improvements in its operations and to
immediately and directly incorporate knowledge from past experience into future
operational decisions. George Stigler said as much 35 years ago in discussing whether it
was wise for an institution to rely entirely on periodic reviews by outsiders to evaluate
programs and identify areas for adjustment:
No organization can achieve or maintain efficiency in structure or operation by
having a critical review made by expert outsiders once each five or ten years—
even if . . . the recommendations of the review panel are unfailingly adopted. A
good organization must have built into its very structure the incentives to its
personnel to do the right things.36

Europe); Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino on Merger
Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST
L.J. 865 (1997) (examining in detail the merger review process in one jurisdiction).
32. For example, efforts in the United States to establish mandatory notification requirements and waiting
periods for proposed mergers drew heavily upon the research of Kenneth G. Elzinga. See Kenneth G. Elzinga,
The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. & ECON. 43 (1969).
33. For example, the United Kingdom’s National Audit Office recently completed an evaluation of the
operations of the Office of Fair Trading. See NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, ENFORCING COMPETITION IN MARKETS
(2005), available at http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/05-06/0506593.pdf (analyzing the
effectiveness of the United Kingdom’s Office of Fair Trading).
34. See Simon J. Evenett, Promoting Competitive Markets in Developing Countries (Mar. 2004),
http://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-32149-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html (describing the IRDC research project).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 46 (2000) (granting the FTC power to gather company data to perform economic
studies, such as ones examining the effects of specific enforcement measures).
36. BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 198 (1970).
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IV. EXPERIENCE WITH PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF COMPETITION AGENCIES
Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing to the present, three strands of
commentary have focused attention on the adequacy of competition agency efforts to
evaluate their performance. The first strand has taken the form of recommendations by
government bodies and individual commentators that competition agencies expand the
amount of resources allocated to evaluating the effects of past enforcement decisions.37
The FTC hearings in 1995 on innovation and globalization were a formative event that
identified an emerging consensus on this point.38 The desirability of devoting greater
resources to ex post evaluation of completed matters was a major theme of competition
policy experts who testified at these and subsequent FTC proceedings.39
A second and distinct strand of noteworthy commentary has come from observers
who question the value of past competition policy initiatives and argue that many
competition policy programs failed to achieve their aim of improving economic
performance.40 Some analysts focus on the lack of evidence suggesting that antitrust
intervention had yielded measurable benefits. Others argued that some or many
interventions had diminished consumer welfare. The mildest policy implication of these

37. See FINGLETON ET AL., supra note 31, at 171 (discussing competition policy enforcement in Visegrad
countries and urging “greater evaluation and refinement of the criteria used in making decisions”); ROBERT A.
KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 204
(1980) (commenting that studies by the FTC “could help resolve current public-policy debates about the role of
antitrust in economic policy” and that “[m]ore work needs to be done about the effects of market concentration;
there is a paucity of information about the impact of antitrust action on various economic indices”); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CLOSER CONTROLS AND BETTER DATA COULD IMPROVE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 15
(1980) (recommending that the U.S. Attorney General ensure that the Antitrust Division of the DOJ “provide[]
for a continuing assessment and evaluation of the effectiveness of enforcement efforts in promoting and
restoring competition”); William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of
the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1147 (1989) (stating that ex post
evaluations could improve the design of government monopolization cases); William E. Kovacic, Federal
Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: Two Cheers for the Disappearance of the Large Firm
Defendant in Nonmerger Cases, 12 RES. L. & ECON. 173, 187 (1989) (advocating ex post evaluations to inform
the selection of cases and litigation techniques); Armando E. Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, Recent Decisions
by the Venezuelan and Peruvian Agencies: Lessons for the Export of Antitrust, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 147, 178
(1998) (suggesting that multinational bodies and individual donors should increase monitoring and analysis of
enforcement decisions of transition economy competition agencies); J. Luis Guasch, Competition Policy
Advocacy and Regulatory Reform (Dec. 13, 1998) (paper presented at the World Bank’s First International
Training Program on Competition Policy) (“It is imperative that competition agencies . . . periodically evaluate
the impact (efficiency and distribution) of their decisions and widely disseminate their findings.”).
38. The results of these proceedings are reported in FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST
CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, VOLUME I (1996),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc_v1.pdf.
39. See Kovacic, supra note 11, at 855-56 (collecting authorities). At an FTC roundtable of industrial
organization economists in September 2001, a central theme of discussion was the desirability of additional
empirical research to analyze the effects of past antitrust enforcement decisions. See Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Empirical
Industrial
Organization
Roundtable
115-41
(Sept.
11,
2001),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/empiricalioroundtabletranscript.pdf.
40. See, e.g., Robert W. Crandall, The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman Act Monopolization
Cases, 80 OR. L. REV. 109 (2001); Robert W. Crandall & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Injunctive Relief in Sherman Act
Monopolization Cases, 21 RES. L. & ECON. 277 (2004); Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, The
Breakdown of ‘Breakup,’ WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2006, at A14.

[KOVACIC] FINAL

516

8/17/2006 10:14:45 AM

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Winter

critiques is that selected forms of antitrust enforcement, such as efforts to control abusive
behavior by dominant firms, had generally been counterproductive and warranted
dramatic retrenchment or abandonment. The bolder proposition in this line of
commentary is that because antitrust laws more often than not retard economic progress,
nations are better off without them.
The third line of commentary has developed in discussions about the appropriate
foundations for economic growth in countries undertaking the transition from central
planning toward greater reliance on market processes. In discussions about economic law
reform, commentators sometimes have questioned the value of placing competition
policy on the reform agenda or have argued that transition economies would do best by
forgoing the enactment of antitrust laws.41 Both variants of this perspective, those who
doubt the benefits of competition policy for transition economies and those who
emphatically oppose the adoption of antitrust laws in transition environments, suggest
that the proponents of competition policy bear the burden, as yet unmet, of showing that
the enactment and implementation of competition laws yield positive results. In effect,
the skeptics and the outright opponents have underscored the value of assembling
evidence that shows the value of competition policy in emerging markets.
The discussion below addresses three types of evaluation related activities
concerning competition agencies: general assessments of competition agency
performance and evaluation efforts, evaluations of the effects of individual interventions
such as cases or advocacy initiatives, and evaluations of agency processes or programs.
This Article describes each type of evaluation activity and provides detailed treatments of
more notable initiatives that illustrate important methodological strengths and
weaknesses of specific approaches.
A. General External Studies of Competition Agency Performance and Evaluation Efforts
On many occasions, competition agencies have been the subject of studies by
external observers who seek to appraise the quality of competition agency performance.
In a number of instances, the authors of these studies have assessed or commented upon
the effectiveness of competition agency efforts to make performance evaluations a
component of routine operations. The general and wide-ranging studies of agency
performance and performance measurement initiatives fall into the four categories
described below.
1. Studies by Individual Researchers or Small Teams of Researchers
One category of inquiry consists of studies that examine the full scope of a
competition agency’s operations or major elements of an agency’s work. Some of these
studies have been performed by individual scholars,42 while others have been assembled

41. See William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition
Economies: The Case of Competition-Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265, 286-90
(2001) (surveying and discussing this literature).
42. Notable examples of this type include KATZMANN, supra note 37; and SUZANNE WEAVER, THE
DECISION TO PROSECUTE: ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION (1977) (studying
the DOJ’s Antitrust Division).
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by teams of researchers.43 The authors of this type of study ordinarily, but not invariably,
enjoy some degree of formal or informal cooperation from insiders at the competition
agency in performing research on the institution.44 The studies tend to focus most
intensely on the quality of the agency’s internal decisionmaking processes, but some
authors have presented detailed evaluations of specific interventions.45
2. Studies by Other Government Institutions
A second category of broad-ranging study consists of works prepared by
government agencies outside the competition authority. The most noteworthy of these
works have been prepared by national authorities with responsibility for auditing
government agencies. Due to their status as government institutions, and by reason of
their information-gathering powers, these auditing authorities typically have extensive
access to the internal records and personnel of the competition agency in performing their
research.
In the United States, Congress occasionally instructs the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) (formerly known as the Government Accounting Office) to study various
features of the operations of the U.S. antitrust agencies. One noteworthy example of this
type of inquiry took place in 1980, when the GAO conducted a detailed assessment of the
management systems of the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ. Among other
findings, the GAO study urged the federal antitrust agencies to devote more resources to
conducting ex post assessments of individual competition matters and to improve internal
management systems for monitoring the progress of investigations and other case-related
activities within the agencies.46 In 2005 the United Kingdom’s National Audit Office
published an assessment of the Office of Fair Trading that involved, among other focal
points, the discussion of performance measures for evaluating the Office’s competition
policy activities.47
3. Studies by Blue Ribbon Panels
Competition agencies occasionally have been the subject of assessments prepared by
special committees or blue ribbon panels. In many instances, blue ribbon panels have
been assembled under the auspices of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), either at
the request of government officials or on the independent initiative of the NGO.48 Other
43. Important contributions of this type include FINGLETON ET AL., supra note 31 (assessing the
implementation of competition policy in the Visegrad countries); THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE
1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR (Kenneth W. Clarkson & Timothy J. Muris
eds., 1981) (studying the FTC); and EDWARD COX ET AL., THE NADER REPORT (1969) (evaluating the
consumer protection activities of the FTC).
44. In some jurisdictions, researchers can take advantage of laws that compel public agencies to disclose
certain types of records.
45. See THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAUCRATIC
BEHAVIOR, supra note 43 (providing detailed assessments of selected competition cases).
46. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 37.
47. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
48. In 1969, at the request of President Richard Nixon, the American Bar Association (ABA) assembled a
blue ribbon panel to evaluate the FTC. In the late 1980s, at its own initiative, the ABA convened blue ribbon
panels to examine the DOJ Antitrust Division and the FTC.
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blue ribbon panels have been established on an ad hoc basis without any attachment to an
existing government or NGO.49
For the most part, blue ribbon panels have devoted most of their attention to the
management of competition agencies, and have focused less upon the wisdom of specific
interventions such as cases or advocacy measures. While performing these processoriented assessments, the blue ribbon inquiries have generally enjoyed substantial
cooperation from the competition agencies, particularly if the blue ribbon panel
originated with a request from the chief of state or the national legislature. The impact of
these inquiries has varied considerably, but one can identify a number of instances in
which the recommendations of the blue ribbon panel have spurred significant reforms in
the management of the competition agency.50
4. Agencywide or Systemwide Evaluations by Multinational Organizations
A fourth category of general assessment has taken the form of studies of national
competition systems or individual competition agencies performed by multinational
organizations. The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
in particular has engaged in two types of broad-based inquiries. In the first type of
inquiry, consultants to the OECD or members of the OECD Competition Committee
Secretariat sometimes conducted studies of the enforcement activities of individual
jurisdictions and published reports of their findings. Although such reports have not
attempted to provide a comprehensive profile of activity, they have provided useful
perspectives on the enforcement programs and operations of the competition authorities
in question.51
The second form of agencywide or systemwide assessment has consisted of “peer
reviews,” a format pioneered by the OECD’s competition committee. In order to build a
foundation for the peer review exercises, OECD consultants or professional staff prepare
reports based on a detailed study of the competition agency’s enforcement patterns,
interviews, and written questionnaires, and conversations with competition policy experts
and business officials inside the country.52 In conducting the investigation, the OECD
researchers typically have enjoyed substantial cooperation from the competition agency
under examination. The reports supply the chief basis for peer review sessions at the
49. A recent example is the Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC), which Congress established to
evaluate various aspects of U.S. competition policy. The AMC received an appropriation of funds from
Congress to hire a professional staff and conduct its operations. For a discussion of the AMC and earlier
antitrust blue ribbon commissions, see Albert A. Foer, Putting the Antitrust Modernization Commission into
Perspective, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 1029 (2003).
50. See William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of Antitrust
Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 630-71 (1982) (describing how recommendations of a 1969 ABA blue ribbon
panel elicited major reforms of the FTC).
51. See John Clark, Competition Law and Policy in the Baltics, OECD J. COMPETITION L. & POL’Y, Sept.
1999, at 144 (providing a representative example of OECD Competition Committee Secretariat reports).
52. See Michael Wise, Review of Competition Law and Policy in Hungary, OECD J. COMPETITION L. &
POL’Y, June 2000, at 57 (providing a small representative sample of OECD peer review studies); Michael Wise,
Review of Competition Law and Policy in Italy, OECD J. COMPETITION L. & POL’Y, Sept. 2001, at 59 (same);
Michael Wise, Review of Competition Law and Policy in Korea, OECD J. COMPETITION L. & POL’Y, Oct. 2000,
at 121 (same); Michael Wise, Review of United States Competition Law and Policy, OECD J. COMPETITION L.
& POL’Y, Feb. 1999, at 3 (same).
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regularly scheduled meetings of the OECD competition committee and the OECD’s
Global Competition Forum. The results of these audits often are made available to the
public. OECD’s peer review efforts have been supplemented by contributions from other
multinational bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO has used
conferences and seminars to promote the benefits of peer review as a means for newer
competition authorities to improve operations and benefit from the transfer of know-how
from more experienced institutions.
5. General Assessments of Competition Agencies by Outsiders: Strengths and
Weaknesses
External observers have made important contributions to our understanding of the
operation of competition agencies and, in important cases, have served to improve agency
management and operations. The agency’s awareness that it will periodically undergo
review by outside researchers and institutions provides an incentive to engage in internal
initiatives to improve operations and to measure performance. Where the external
examiner or examining body is an expert in the operations of the competition agency and
enjoys extensive access to the agency’s internal records and personnel, it is possible to
offer an informative diagnosis of the agency’s work and to suggest useful avenues for
improvement.
However, reliance on external observers to perform general assessments of
competition agency performance can suffer from four basic problems. One weakness in
the general assessments generated by outsiders, particularly evident in the work of blue
ribbon panels, is the lack of consistent and commonly accepted criteria for measuring
agency performance. The external researcher or research body may fail to carefully
specify its evaluative standards and, in reviewing the findings of previous evaluative
research, may fail to identify differences in the standards applied by earlier studies.53 The
rush to prepare the instant report often denies the blue ribbon panel time to do the more
discriminating and historically accurate assessment that is vital to making sound
assessments about the quality of past performance and to make sensible
recommendations about future improvements.
A second problem concerns the knowledge base of the external analysts. In some
cases, the external observers lack adequate access to agency records and personnel to
develop a confident understanding of the agency’s current operations. This is less
problematic for researchers, such as national audit bodies or panels operating with the
endorsement of the chief executive or national legislature, with strong tools to compel
cooperation than it is for individual researchers seeking, without official government
sponsorship, to conduct broad-ranging studies of agency operations. Another form of
knowledge deficiency is the researcher’s limited background in the agency or in the
competition policy field generally. Without a well-informed lens for studying the agency,
it is unlikely that the researcher will make accurate or wise interpretations of what he
observes.
A third problem concerns the incentives of the external observer to provide a fully
53. Blue ribbon panels have a habit of reciting the conclusions of earlier and related blue ribbon studies
without accounting for differences in the evaluative standards applied by previous panels. See Kovacic, supra
note 50, at 599-602 (discussing the work of blue ribbon panels examining FTC performance).
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candid assessment of the agency’s operations. A researcher, or member of a research
team, who wishes to have a future relationship or to work in cooperation with the
competition agency may be reluctant to give a truly unvarnished assessment of the
agency’s flaws. When an agency cooperates with an external reviewer by choice and not
by compulsion, the agency may decline to participate in exercises in which the reviewer
refuses, implicitly or explicitly, to moderate harsh conclusions, at least for public
consumption. This is an inherent limitation of the voluntary peer review exercises
conducted by OECD and other multinational bodies. If the peer review report is
absolutely unflinching in its criticism of a competition agency, and if discussants at
OECD meetings pull no punches in their interrogatories to agency officials, agencies may
be unwilling to subject themselves to such assessments.54
A fourth problem concerns the passivity that may permeate an agency that relies
chiefly on outsiders to conduct occasional reviews of the agency’s performance. Reviews
by outsiders can complement, but cannot substitute completely for, the agency’s own
efforts to engage in a continuous and routine assessment of its interventions and
operations. As noted in Part III.F above, the aim should be to encourage each competition
agency to devise its own mechanisms to evaluate and improve the quality of its work.
B. Case-Specific Evaluations of Competition Agency Intervention
The antonym of the macroscopic and highly generalized assessment of agency
performance described above is the narrowly focused and microscopic evaluation of the
effects of specific interventions. This subsection discusses the evaluation of individual
initiatives. This form of inquiry has been the province of individual researchers,
competition agencies, and multinational bodies, as blue ribbon panels generally have not
made detailed assessments of individual matters. The discussion below reviews
experience with case studies and examines the most ambitious effort to date by a
competition agency to evaluate case outcomes.
1. Studies Performed by Outside Researchers Without Competition Agency Involvement
Most of the case-specific evaluations of the substantive outcomes of competition
agency interventions have been performed by academics working alone or in small
teams. With some notable exceptions, discussed below, academics have performed their
evaluations of individual cases solely on the basis of publicly available data and without
access to the competition agency’s internal records. These studies are “independent” of
the competition agency in the sense that they neither depend on the competition agency
as a source of information nor do they require the researchers to make explicit or implicit
concessions to the agency as a condition for performing the research. The main limitation
of such studies is the lack of access researchers ordinarily have to internal agency records
that reveal the thought process that led to the decision to prosecute.

54. A compromise of sorts that may address this problem is for the peer review researcher to provide
highly sensitive criticisms privately to the agency under review and to moderate or omit such criticisms in
reports or presentations made to a larger audience.
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2. Studies by Other Government Bodies: GAO Study of U.S. Petroleum Mergers
Government agencies with audit responsibilities have occasionally conducted
detailed studies of individual competition agency enforcement decisions. In 2004, the
GAO published the most ambitious effort to date by a government audit authority to
evaluate the effects of a competition agency’s interventions.55 The GAO sought to
measure the competitive effects of eight petroleum industry mergers completed between
1997 and 2000. The FTC had reviewed and approved all eight mergers. However, it had
required the merging parties to make significant divestitures in some of the transactions.
The mergers the GAO analyzed included Exxon’s acquisition of Mobil, which the FTC
approved following the largest divestiture of retail assets in the history of U.S. merger
control.
To perform its study, the GAO developed econometric models to identify how the
mergers and supplier concentration affected prices of gasoline. In formulating its model
and research plan, the GAO relied mainly on its own staff of economists to develop the
models, but also consulted external advisors, including several expert economists in
petroleum industry competition issues. The GAO acquired data purchasing information
on wholesale prices from a private firm, the Oil Price Information Service, which
monitors petroleum industry activities. The GAO shared an initial draft of its report with
the FTC, which offered extensive critical comments on the study’s methodology. The
GAO largely declined to accept the FTC’s methodological suggestions and published the
report in May 2004. The GAO study concluded that six of the eight mergers it reviewed
resulted in price increases, while two caused gasoline prices to fall.
Publication of the petroleum merger study triggered an extended and intense public
debate between the GAO and the FTC about the soundness of the GAO’s work. The FTC
contended that the GAO report contained serious methodological errors that negated the
reliability of its results.56 The FTC argued that three fundamental flaws undermined the
GAO study. First, in performing econometric analyses of specific mergers, the GAO
allegedly failed to account properly for many factors that affect gasoline prices. Second,
the FTC contended that the GAO’s assessment of how concentration affects prices did
not use the properly defined relevant markets that sound industrial organization analysis
requires. Third, the FTC said that the GAO failed to consider critical facts about
individual transactions, such as Exxon’s merger with Mobil, that were vital to assessing
their impact on prices.
In January 2005, the FTC and GAO jointly convened a conference to discuss the
work that the two agencies had done to evaluate the effects of petroleum industry
mergers.57 Academic economists, including several experts in econometrics, critiqued the
55. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENERGY MARKETS: EFFECT OF MERGERS AND MARKET
CONCENTRATION IN THE U.S. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (2004).
56. Market Forces, Anticompetitive Activity, and Gasoline Prices: FTC Initiatives to Protect Competitive
Markets: Hearing on the Status of the U.S. Refining Industry Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Air Quality
(July 15, 2004) (prepared statement of the FTC, presented by William E. Kovacic, FTC General Counsel),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/07/040715gaspricetestimony.pdf.
57. Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the FTC and GAO Joint
Conference on Petroleum Industry Mergers: Estimating the Price Effects of Mergers and Concentration in the
Petroleum Industry: An Evaluation of Recent Learning (Jan. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050114oilmergerconferenceremarks.pdf (describing the conference to
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work of the two agencies. Two major limitations of this exercise were the GAO’s refusal
to fully specify its econometric methodology and its refusal to make available all the data
used to run its models. A number of commentators pointed out that without the full
revelation of the model and all the data used to run the model, it would be impossible to
conduct a meaningful test of the GAO results.
3. Case-Specific Reviews Performed by Multinational Bodies
A number of multinational organizations have conducted seminars or workshops
whose focus was on the analysis of specific enforcement measures undertaken by new
competition authorities. OECD has carried out several forms of evaluation exercises since
the early 1990s.58 OECD has conducted regular case seminars that have provided detailed
examination of selected enforcement initiatives of transition economy competition
agencies.59 In the case seminar format, small teams of foreign experts meet for several
days with case handlers and other officials from the competition authorities to review
specific cases. The outside advisors examine the competition agency’s prosecution files
and hear presentations by the competition agency officials, who recount their decision to
prosecute and discuss the responses of the defendant firms. The foreign advisors then
critique the agency’s work. Variants of the case seminars have taken place in regional
conferences organized by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) individually or in cooperation with other donor bodies.
4. Case-Specific Reviews Undertaken or Sponsored by Competition Agencies
Over the past 25 years competition agencies on some occasions have conducted
studies of individual cases. As described below in Part IV.B.5, the FTC in the late 1970s
and early 1980s sponsored evaluations by outside academics of FTC decisions involving
vertical restraints60 and dominant firm behavior.61 Among other assessments completed
in the past decade, the FTC and its professional staff published studies of the agency’s
interventions to control mergers in the soft drink industry,62 the implementation of
divestiture decrees in merger cases,63 the effect of mergers in the hospital sector,64 and

examine methodologies to evaluate the effects of petroleum industry mergers).
58. See William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competitive Policy Reform in Transition Economies for U.S.
Antitrust Policy, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 361, 394-95 (2000) (discussing OECD programs to evaluate antitrust
enforcement).
59. The author thanks Sally Van Siclen for many useful conversations about the OECD case seminars.
60. See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL
RESTRAINTS CASES (Ronald N. Lafferty et al. eds., 1984) (presenting the results of assessments of FTC vertical
restraints cases).
61. See Timothy Bresnahan, Post-Entry Competition in the Plain Paper Copier Market, 75 AM. ECON.
REV. 15 (1985) (presenting an evaluation of the relief obtained in 1975 by the FTC through settlement of its
abuse of dominance complaint against Xerox).
62. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TRANSFORMATION AND CONTINUITY: THE U.S. CARBONATED SOFT
DRINK BOTTLING INDUSTRY AND ANTITRUST POLICY SINCE 1980 (1999).
63. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE
PROCESS (1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf.
64. Michael G. Vita & Seth Sacher, The Competitive Effects of Not-For-Profit Hospital Mergers: A Case
Study, 49 J. INDUS. ECON. 63 (2001).
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the effect of mergers in the petroleum industry.65 The FTC also has sought to improve the
aggregate measures of performance mandated by Congress under the Government
Performance and Results Act.66
In the late 1980s, the DOJ, acting pursuant to the terms of a consent decree, funded
research concerning the effects of the restructuring of AT&T.67 DOJ researchers also
reviewed the consequences of selected mergers of airlines in the 1980s68 and examined
the effects of mergers of accounting firms in the 1990s.69 DOJ economists currently are
performing research on the consequences of mergers in other industries.
Of agency sponsored evaluations that have been completed, one of the most
interesting was conducted in the 1990s by the Peruvian competition agency, the National
Institute for Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property (Indecopi).70
During her tenure as Indecopi’s chair, Beatriz Boza invited academics and practitioners
to serve as researchers in residence in Indecopi and to study various aspects of Indecopi’s
substantive programs and administrative procedures. As such, the researchers had
extensive access to internal Indecopi records and to the agency’s officials.
The results of the researchers’ work, which Boza called an “academic audit,” were
published following internal discussion and comment within Indecopi.71 The publication
of the studies fulfilled Indecopi’s commitment to the researchers at the outset of the
project to publish the completed papers (redacted to omit nonpublic information), without
regard to whether the researchers praised or criticized the agency. Boza and her
colleagues regarded the preparation and publication of the studies as important vehicles
for improving the quality of Indecopi’s decisionmaking and increasing public awareness
of the institution.
In addition to these completed evaluation projects, a number of competition agencies
in recent years have initiated projects to evaluate the impact of individual cases. Among
other developments, various bodies with competition policy duties in the UK have been
conducting research to document the consequences of individual cases.72

65. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: MERGERS, STRUCTURAL CHANGE, AND
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT (2004); Christopher T. Taylor & Daniel S. Hosken, The Economic Effects of the
Marathon-Ashland Joint Venture: The Importance of Industry Supply Shocks and Vertical Market Structure
(U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Econ. Working Paper No. 270, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=532427.
66. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285.
67. See PETER W. HUBER, THE GEODESIC NETWORK: 1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE
INDUSTRY (1987) (evaluating the effects of the AT&T divestiture).
68. Gregory J. Werden et al., The Effects of Mergers on Price and Output: Two Case Studies from the
Airline Industry, 12 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 341 (1991).
69. Mary W. Sullivan, The Effect of the Big Eight Accounting Firm Mergers on the Market for Audit
Services, 45 J.L. & ECON. 375 (2002).
70. Indecopi’s creation and early operations are examined in PERU’S EXPERIENCE IN MARKET
REGULATORY REFORM 1993-1998 (Beatriz Boza ed., 1998).
71. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN COMPETITION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA:
TOWARDS AN ACADEMIC AUDIT OF INDECOPI (Beatriz Boza ed., 2000) (presenting the results of an academic
audit of Indecopi’s competition policy programs).
72. See Paul A. Geroski, Chairman, Competition Comm’n, Remarks at the Opening of the Centre for
Competition Policy at the University of East Anglia: Is Competition Policy Worth It? (Sept. 14, 2004),
available
at
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/our_peop/members/chair_speeches/pdf/
geroski_uea_140904.pdf (reporting on research performed by the UK Department of Trade and Industry and the
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5. The FTC Vertical Restraints and Abuse of Dominance Impact Evaluations
As mentioned above, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the FTC carried out a
program to evaluate the consequences of vertical restraints cases and one abuse of
dominance case commenced in the 1970s.73 The impetus for the studies was a letter
transmitted in 1978 by a congressional committee to the FTC Chairman, Michael
Pertschuk, asking that the FTC perform case studies of vertical restraints cases. The
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly suggested that the FTC examine its
experience with vertical restraints enforcement to explore the possibility indicated the
previous year in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.74 that there might be an
empirical basis for adopting a per se rule of illegality for various nonprice vertical
restraints. Thus, the original impetus for conducting the studies was external, by a
congressional request, rather than internal to the FTC.
The congressional letter led the FTC to devise a project to assess the effects of
various vertical restraints cases initiated in the 1970s. The FTC chose to focus the vertical
restraints evaluations of its past enforcement activities in five industries: shoes, blue
jeans, audio components, industrial gases, and hearing aids. The cases in question
addressed price and nonprice distribution practices, with the majority of cases
challenging minimum resale price maintenance arrangements. In addition to reviewing
vertical restraint matters, the agency decided to use the project as an occasion to evaluate
the consequences of other areas of enforcement. The tentative initial plan was to include
at least one case involving abuse of dominance—a major area of enforcement priority for
the FTC in the 1970s—and at least one case involving horizontal mergers. Responsibility
for carrying out the project was assigned to the Assistant Director for Planning in the
FTC’s Bureau of Competition, John Kirkwood, who assembled a team of two FTC
attorneys and two FTC economists to manage the project.
The agency’s decision to proceed with an evaluation of past competition cases was
not well received by the professional staff of the Bureau of Competition, the FTC’s
antitrust enforcement unit. A central concern was that any study that questioned the
wisdom or efficacy of the FTC’s past interventions would be used to undermine its
position in pending competition cases or, more generally, would be used to discredit the
agency’s competition policy work. A further concern was that any findings that found the
FTC had achieved beneficial results in the cases studied would be dismissed by outsiders
as the product of efforts by the FTC to manipulate the design and execution of the study
to generate positive assessments. In short, outcomes favorable to the FTC’s interests
would be disregarded, whereas outcomes critical of the FTC’s work would be embraced
as evidence of institutional failure. Whatever the result, argued the staff of the Bureau of
Competition, the agency could not “win.”
To inform the design of the study, the FTC impact evaluation team retained two
prominent industrial organization scholars, Richard Caves and Ben Klein, to prepare

UK Competition Commission).
73. By way of disclosure, the author of this Article was a member of the FTC team that oversaw the
design and implementation of the impact evaluation project described here. The author was the principal FTC
representative for the evaluation of the Xerox abuse of dominance consent decree. As recounted here, details of
the project are based on the account provided in FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 60.
74. Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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research protocols. The protocols suggested approaches that researchers might use to
evaluate the outcomes of FTC vertical restraint cases and sketched the sequence of
investigative steps that the FTC might follow to conduct the studies.75 Based on the
Caves and Klein protocols and discussions with the FTC’s Bureaus of Competition and
Economics, the impact evaluation team decided that the case studies would have
essentially four elements: (1) a review of publicly available material relevant to the case,
including academic literature and trade press accounts that provided information about
the effects of the FTC’s intervention; (2) an examination of the FTC decision in the case,
the FTC’s internal files concerning the case, and the record of any administrative
proceedings; (3) the preparation of a report evaluating the impact of the case based on
items (1) and (2); and (4) recommendations for collection of further data to test more
fully the conclusions presented in the researcher’s written report.
The impact evaluation team then confronted the question of which researchers
would conduct the studies. One possibility was to perform the work in-house by
assigning the studies to economists in the FTC’s Bureau of Economics. The agency
rejected this alternative on the ground that reliance on FTC insiders would raise questions
about the credibility and reliability of the results. This concern led the FTC to seek
outside researchers to perform the studies. The Caves and Klein research protocols
suggested the strategy chosen to enlist outside researchers: hire well-regarded and
relatively junior academicians to perform the studies. Because the FTC could pay no
more than $10,000 per study, it was highly unlikely that more senior and better known
economists could be persuaded to do the work.
With the assistance of Caves, Klein, and other outside academics, the impact
evaluation team sought to identify economists who, though junior in their academic
careers, had shown promise in the field of industrial organization economics. The choice
of researchers from this set of candidates posed its own difficulties. Researchers often
approach a topic of inquiry—for example, the analysis of vertical restraints—with a point
of view shaped by training, personal philosophical perspectives, and past research. With a
close reading of the researcher’s previous written work and some inquiry into the
individual’s policy preferences, one could determine whether the researcher would be
inclined to take a favorable view of the FTC’s theory of the case and its decision to
prosecute.
Had it chosen to do so, the FTC could have skewed the results of the studies by
giving research contracts to academics with a generally positive view of vertical restraints
enforcement or the prosecution of other cases, such as abuse of dominance matters, that
the agency meant to study. Aware that such an approach easily could discredit the entire
enterprise, the agency consciously sought to assemble a collection of researchers with a
balance of philosophical perspectives.76 Though the researchers disagreed about the value
of vertical restraints cases, they shared the characteristic of having highly regarded
technical skills and training. For example, the selection process produced a number of
researchers, among them, Victor Goldberg, Howard Marvel, and Sharon Oster, who have

75. The Caves and Klein research protocols are reproduced in FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 60.
76. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 60, at 9 (reporting that the FTC impact evaluation team selected the
vertical restraints researchers “on the basis of both their academic expertise, particularly in vertical restraints,
and the diversity of perspectives they would bring to the project”).

[KOVACIC] FINAL

526

8/17/2006 10:14:45 AM

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Winter

achieved considerable distinction in their subsequent professional careers. The impact
evaluation team selected Timothy Bresnahan to perform the abuse of dominance study of
the Xerox consent decree. Bresnahan was well on his way to becoming a leading figure in
the field of industrial organization economics.
As the researchers assembled publicly available information to prepare their studies,
the FTC’s impact evaluation team gathered the FTC’s records on the cases and supplied
the relevant records to each researcher. The outside economists received the internal precomplaint memoranda prepared by the Bureaus of Competition and Economics, among
the most important confidential agency records provided, concerning the decision to
prosecute. These documents laid out and analyzed the results of the pre-complaint
investigation and the proposed theory of the case.
To gain access to these and other nonpublic records, the researchers signed
nondisclosure agreements that forbade the publication of nonpublic information. The
FTC’s contracts with the outside experts permitted the researchers to publish their work
and committed the agency to use its best efforts to publish the studies. The contract also
required the researchers to provide, before submission for publication in journals or in
other works, the FTC with drafts of their papers to enable FTC attorneys to ensure that
nonpublic material had been excised. Subject to this restriction, the researchers could
freely publish their work, and several researchers did publish versions of their studies in
professional journals.77
Beyond the process of omitting nonpublic information, the researchers had to submit
an initial draft for substantive review and comments by the FTC staff. To a considerable
extent, the FTC’s review of the drafts focused on technical issues—such as the accuracy
of the researcher’s characterization of the FTC’s internal deliberations and the agency’s
theory of the case, the completeness of the researcher’s literature review, and the
thoroughness of exposition. At the same time, the preliminary conclusions included in
some of the initial drafts rekindled the anxiety of some FTC attorneys who had opposed
the initiation of the evaluation project. The researchers issued some favorable
assessments of the FTC’s cases, but some were decidedly unfavorable. The receipt of the
initial drafts again raised the question of whether the agency should carry the project to
its intended conclusion.
The impact evaluation team and other internal FTC reviewers pressed the
researchers, as well as those sympathetic and hostile to the FTC’s cases, to defend their
methodology and conclusions. Some discussions with the academics who authored
unflattering assessments of the FTC’s work were contentious. Despite intense
disagreements between the FTC and some researchers and internal FTC discomfort with
the unfavorable evaluations, the FTC fulfilled its commitment to publish the results and
permitted the researchers to seek publication of their papers.
From a number of perspectives, the impact evaluation project was a success. The
published studies presented highly informative critiques of the FTC’s economic theories
in each case, offered a useful preliminary assessment of the likely effect of FTC
intervention, and proposed a sensible methodology for conducting further empirical
study. The studies yielded valuable insights into the cases examined, made strong
77. For two prominent and oft-cited examples see Bresnahan, supra note 61, and Howard P. Marvel,
Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1982).
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contributions to our understanding of price and nonprice vertical restraints, and the
compulsory patent licensing remedy imposed to resolve the abuse of dominance
prosecution against Xerox.
An intended element of the original impact evaluation program—the pursuit of
follow-on work to conduct further empirical testing—never took place, as the FTC chose
not to allocate additional resources for these undertakings. Thus, an inherent limitation of
the studies is their relatively thin empirical foundation. The outside researchers were able
to assess the coherence of the FTC’s theory of the cases and to evaluate the wisdom of its
decision to prosecute in light of evidence available to the FTC at the time the complaints
were issued. Beyond collecting publicly available information about industry
developments, the researchers were unable to conduct empirical tests of their hypotheses
about the likely economic consequences of each case.
From an institutional perspective, the FTC’s willingness to perform the studies and
its actual execution of the project seems to have enhanced the agency’s reputation by
demonstrating its commitment to subject enforcement choices to rigorous analysis by
outsiders. At the same time, one must acknowledge that the performance of ex post
assessments does come with internal costs for the agency that go beyond the allocation of
resources to perform and manage the studies. The pursuit of the project did arouse
internal opposition. In one instance, a respondent in a pending vertical restraints case
introduced the critical assessment of an FTC case by one outside researcher to bolster its
case for exculpation. The FTC ultimately decided to dismiss its complaint in the matter,78
though it is difficult to tell what impact the researcher’s study had upon the agency’s
ruling.
C. Process-Oriented Evaluations of Competition Agency Operations and Organization
The second category of modern evaluation experience takes the form of efforts to
analyze key elements of the process and operations of competition agencies. Unlike the
case-specific studies described above, the process-oriented reviews do not seek to analyze
the competitive consequences of individual agency interventions. The focus of processoriented studies has been to evaluate the quality of agency decisionmaking and to test the
soundness of procedures used to carry out the agency’s responsibilities.
1. Process-Based Evaluations by Competition Agencies
The past quarter-century has featured extraordinary innovation and change in the
design of competition systems and the management of competition agencies. The growth
in the number of new systems, a phenomenon often depicted as a source of troublesome
complexity, has spurred a remarkable process of experimentation with institutional
design and unprecedented attention to the role that the choice of institutional
arrangements plays in shaping substantive policy results. This period has witnessed
dramatic upgrades in jurisdictions that were among the first nations to adopt competition
laws, such as Australia and Canada, as well as in other jurisdictions that are more recent
arrivals to the community of nations with competition laws, such as South Africa and
South Korea. It is the rare jurisdiction that has not taken steps in recent years to retool
78. In re Beltone Elec. Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68, 221 (1982).
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important aspects of the structure, responsibilities, or remedies of its competition agency.
In recent years, the Competition Directorate of the European Commission (DG
Comp) has conducted a number of formative studies of its own procedures and, more
generally, of the operation of the EU’s system of competition law. In many instances,
these assessments of process and policymaking have inspired far-reaching reforms.79 In
the period since 2000 alone, the results flowing from DG Comp’s process-oriented
evaluations have included the creation of the position of chief economist within the top
management tier of the institution, the establishment of “devil’s advocate” panels to test
the strength of theories and evidence on which cases might be based, an internal
reorganization that, among other effects, redistributed authority for the review of
mergers, and a modernization program that decentralizes key decisionmaking functions
to the national competition authorities of the EU member states and vests the national
courts with expanded adjudication responsibilities.
The EU also has actively engaged in broad programmatic reviews of important areas
of DG Comp policymaking. One focal point of attention has been the retooling of
enforcement protocols, including the issuance of new guidelines concerning the licensing
of intellectual property.80 Still more recently, DG Comp has completed a substantial
inquiry into the implementation of its remedies in competition cases.81
Another noteworthy example of process-oriented reform is the Office of Fair Trade
(OFT) in the UK. A basic reassessment of the adequacy of remedies for serious antitrust
offenses led OFT to develop and gain acceptance for proposals to treat the creation of
cartels as crimes. Reflecting on its experience in dealing with competition issues arising
in formerly or currently regulated sectors, OFT has played a leading role in devising
innovative approaches to improving relations with sectoral regulators and coordinating
operations. OFT leadership also has been engaged in internal assessments about how best
to organize the case investigation and litigation.
A final representative illustration comes from the FTC’s experience in the 1990s of
evaluating the effectiveness of its process for designing remedies for mergers.82 The
study constituted the FTC’s first effort to evaluate the quality of its merger remedies
since the adoption of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act in 1976, which
established the modern U.S. framework for advance notification of certain mergers.83
79. The dramatic modern reforms of the European competition policy system since 2000 are detailed and
analyzed in WOUTER P.J. WILS, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1-59 (2005).
80. Philip Lowe & Luc Peeperkorn, Singing in Tune with Competition and Innovation: The New EU
Competition Policy Towards Licensing, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 265 (Barry E. Hawk
ed., 2005).
81. See DG COMP, EUROPEAN COMM’N, MERGER REMEDIES STUDY (2005), available at
http://www.ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/others/remedies_study.pdf.
82. See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, supra note 63. The FTC’s 1999 merger remedies study is one element
of a larger collection of merger control process reviews that the U.S. agencies have undertaken, beginning in the
early 1990s and continuing until the present. See Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at
the George Mason University Law Review’s Winter Antitrust Symposium: Improving the Economic
Foundations
of
Competition
Policy
11-13
(Jan.
15,
2003),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/improveconfoundatio.htm (describing FTC studies of effects of mergers).
83. The congressional proponents of the merger reforms adopted in the 1976 legislation relied extensively
on the work of academic researchers who found that divestitures imposed as remedies for consummated
mergers seldom achieved their intended remedial goals. See Elzinga, supra note 32 (discussing the antimerger
provision of the Clayton Act).
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Among other consequences, the creation of compulsory notification requirements and
mandatory waiting periods facilitated more extensive recourse to settlements that used
divestitures and various conduct-related undertakings to resolve discrete competitive
concerns.
The FTC study was an internally generated initiative that emerged from research
being conducted by the Compliance Division of the FTC’s Bureaus of Competition and
Economics. In their experience with mergers, the professional staff of these operational
units had identified a number of potential weaknesses in FTC remedy practice. Existing
practice dictated that the FTC track compliance with divestiture obligations only to the
point that the agency approved a specific divestiture proposal and the merging parties
actually divested the assets in question. The FTC’s process took no account, in any
systematic way, of whether the purchaser of the divested assets eventually used the assets
to make sales in the relevant market or whether the purchaser’s participation in the
market with the divested assets had any competitive effect. In addition to its own
experience, the FTC staff was aware of a wealth of academic literature that doubted the
effectiveness of many merger remedies, including remedies achieved after the
implementation of the Hart-Scott-Rodino reforms in the late 1970s.84
Reflecting on these experiences, the FTC’s professional staff in 1995 recommended
that the agency carry out a systematic assessment of its divestiture process. Compared to
earlier FTC research on merger remedies, the novelty of the proposed study was its
emphasis on questioning the buyers of divested assets about the ultimate disposition and
use of those assets. The FTC carried out the study in two parts. It first undertook a pilot
study to test its methodology, which consisted mainly of open-ended telephone
interviews of purchasers of assets divested pursuant to settlements in merger cases. After
accounting for the results of the pilot inquiry, the FTC carried out a more comprehensive
assessment and examined 35 orders entered from October 1989 through September 1994
in which it had required the divestiture of assets. The chosen five-year period permitted
the agency to examine divestitures whose effects would have had an impact in the market
and that took place recently enough that the buyers would have relatively clear memories
of the divestiture experience. The 35 cases also involved a broad range of industries,
purchasers, and divested assets.
The FTC relied mainly on a team of its own attorneys and economists to conduct the
study, although it obtained comments on drafts from a business school professor, David
Ravenscraft, who had extensive experience with data collection and analysis of mergers
and acquisitions. The FTC staff identified 50 buyers who had purchased assets divested
in the 35 cases and interviewed 37 of them. The staff also interviewed eight of the
merging party respondents and two third parties. The FTC published the results of its
inquiry in 1999 and highlighted four findings: (1) three-quarters of the divestitures
examined in the study “succeeded to some degree;”85 (2) settlements that compelled the
divestiture of ongoing businesses succeeded more frequently than divestitures of discrete
assets; (3) the possibility of continuing entanglements and relationships between
purchaser and seller required close attention by the competition agency, as such links

84. The relevant literature is collected and reviewed in Mikhail S. Kouliavtsev, Some Empirical Evidence
on the Effectiveness of Antimerger Relief in the United States, 43 ECON. INQUIRY 370 (2005).
85. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, supra note 63, at 8.
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sometimes posed unexpected problems for the purchasers, and sometimes may have been
critical for the purchaser’s success in using the divested assets; and (4) smaller firms
succeeded at the same rate as larger firms in using the divested assets.
The 1999 divestiture study was highly informative for the FTC and other
competition agencies. The study’s results inspired significant adjustments in the agency’s
evaluation of settlement proposals involving divestitures, and altered the types of
demands that the FTC subsequently made in settlement negotiations. The study led a
number of competition agencies in other jurisdictions to reevaluate their own approaches
to remedies in merger cases and, in some instances, to undertake their own variants of the
FTC’s inquiry.
In certain respects, the study’s aim was relatively modest. It did not measure the
actual competitive effects of FTC merger remedies only, but rather attempted “to draw
conclusions about whether the buyer of the divested assets was able to enter the market
and maintain operations.”86 Yet even so limited an inquiry is valuable. If a basic
assumption of an agency’s merger remedy policy is that divested assets will remain in the
relevant market and assist a firm other than the merging parties to compete for sales, it is
worth knowing whether the purchaser succeeded in using the assets to accomplish any
sales. If the answer to this question is “no” in more than a trivial number of
circumstances, the agency needs to rethink its assumptions about the efficacy of its
merger control policy. If the answer is typically “yes,” it is still helpful to know what
makes for a successful divestiture and to use that knowledge to improve merger solutions
in the future.
Perhaps the greatest limitation of the FTC study is its cursory description of the
criterion used to measure the success of the purchaser in deploying the divested assets.
The FTC reported that of the 37 divestitures it studied, “28 appear to have resulted in
viable operations in the relevant market.”87 The FTC added that in each of the 28
successful cases, “the approved buyer acquired the assets, began operations, and was
operating in the relevant market within a reasonable time.”88 The FTC study did not
specify what practical test it used in deciding whether a firm had engaged in “viable
operations”—a term that might encompass a single sale, or thousands of sales, in the
relevant market.
The experience of DG Comp, OFT, FTC, and other agencies underscores several
important elements of effective process-oriented review. Two characteristics stand out.
The first is the importance of the competition agency in stepping back and undertaking a
deliberate and comprehensive assessment of the efficacy of specific programs or
procedures. A meaningful review of an agency’s practices cannot be done in a halfhearted manner. In all instances, the competition agency in question was willing to
devote some of its best human resources to examine selected areas of operation and to
suggest improvements. The second, a closely related characteristic, is the role that
comparative study has played in suggesting paths for reform. Benchmarking across
jurisdictions served to illuminate operational or programmatic alternatives and supplied
an experience base with which to assess the qualities of such alternatives.

86. Id. at 9.
87. Id. at 10
88. Id.
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2. Process-Oriented Evaluations by Multinational Bodies
The peer review exercises, described in Part IV.A.4 above, have provided an
important means for process-oriented evaluation. The positive reaction to peer review
projects that international organizations have received from their members and affiliates
suggests that competition agencies would welcome greater efforts by the larger and
global multinational bodies, such as the International Competition Network, OECD, or
UNCTAD, to focus more attention on issues of agency management and operations.
Among many competition agencies, there appears to be a keen desire to meet with peer
institutions to discuss, analyze, and benchmark each other with respect to basic
operational matters. Important focal points for such engagements might include the
process for developing an agency-wide strategic plan, the optimal approach for
organizing the agency’s staff, whether it is organized along functional lines, by sector, or
with an independent unit for economists, the design of internal quality control measures,
the relationship of the legal services department to case handling units, and the best way
to coordinate activities with other government bodies, such as sectoral regulators, with
substantive portfolios that overlap the portfolio of the competition agency.
In multinational gatherings, the extensive attention given to the question of what
competition agencies should do, whether they are to give top priority to prosecuting
cartels or to apply a dominance test or a substantial lessening of competition standard in
merger control, has tended to overshadow the equally important question of how they
should do it. In the formal meeting rooms, delegates often discuss whether one analytical
concept is superior to another. In the conversations during breaks, meals, or social
gatherings, the delegates frequently ask each other how their home agencies decide what
to do and press for practical details about how common administrative tasks are carried
out. There is considerable room for multinational bodies to serve their members’ interests
by putting questions of management and internal procedure on the agenda more
frequently and more prominently.
3. The OECD Performance Management Initiative
One particularly noteworthy initiative by a multinational body to improve
performance measurement is the OECD Competition Committee’s recently established
Institutional Assessment and Development Project. The OECD project seeks to use
lessons from performance measurement experience in private and public institutions in
recent decades to prepare an instrument for assessing the quality of internal management
and procedures of competition authorities and for indicating areas for improvement. As
tested in various public and private settings, the key steps of the performance
management methodology are (1) the articulation of the “core principles” of the
organization to be studied; (2) selecting types of behavior that indicate whether the
organization is adhering to the core principles; (3) creating an internal assessment
procedure that uses the behavioral criteria to measure the organization’s operations; (4)
conducting an assessment of the organization, focusing mainly on the organization’s
managers but also involving consultation in some instances with external experts; (5)
using the results of the assessment to improve the structure or decisionmaking processes
of the organization; and (6) repeating the assessment on a regular basis to evaluate the
implementation of reforms and to identify further areas for improvement.
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To adapt this framework to the assessment of competition agencies, OECD
consulted various individuals—“key informants”—with expertise in the operations of
competition agencies to identify the operational characteristics of successful competition
agencies and prepared an assessment instrument, principally, a questionnaire, to apply to
individual competition agencies. The aim of the project is to develop a methodology that
competition agencies can apply systematically to evaluate existing procedures on a
continuing basis over time and to incorporate the results of each inquiry into the
formulation and execution of reforms. As tested and applied within a number of
individual jurisdictions, the project seeks to develop a more scientific and empirically
based foundation for competition agencies to raise the quality of their management and
operational routines.
Two potential contributions of the project deserve emphasis. First, the very effort to
identify the “core principles” and key behavioral characteristics could provide valuable
insights into what separates a “good” or “superior” competition agency from a merely
adequate institution.89 Views about the quality of competition agencies often are based on
idiosyncratic impressions about the volume and type of an agency’s outputs—mainly the
prosecution of cases. The initiation and litigation of cases provide readily observable
events for analysis by academics, practitioners, and journalists. To a large degree,
enforcement actions, especially “big” cases involving easily recognized respondents,
commonly are assumed to be the proper measure of what a government agency has
done.90
In critical respects, the case-centric vision of competition policy is unduly narrow.
Taken on its own terms, the case-centric perspective gives excessive weight to
spectacular matters involving easily recognized respondents and routinely undervalues
the “small” case that can make “big” law.91 By lauding the enforcement official who files
the enforcement action, the case-centric view of competition policy tends to overlook
what the cases actually accomplished. This is the equivalent of measuring an airline’s
quality by the number and size of departing flights without devoting equal attention to
how, when, and where the airplanes descend to earth.
Equally serious weaknesses of case-centrism are its disregard for non-litigation
policy instruments and its indifference to investments in institutional capability that are
vital to successful policymaking. Case-centrism treats advocacy, for example, the filing
of comments on proposed legislation or administrative regulations, as a feeble substitute
for prosecuting cases. Nor does case-centrism respect an agency’s commitment to build
the intellectual capital that informs the choice and execution of litigation and nonlitigation interventions alike.
89. The 2003-2004 Annual Report of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission illustrates
how a competition authority can identify the “core principles” that motivate its efforts and can specify the
behavioral traits by which it measures fulfillment of such principles and invites outsiders to assess its progress.
AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2003-04 (2004), available at
http://www.accc.gov/au/content/item.phtml?itemId=607851&nodeId=file4240b7666fed2&fn=ACCC%20AR20
03-04_whole%20report.pdf.
90. See generally Kovacic, supra note 12 (emphasizing the cumulative nature of competition
policymaking).
91. Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address Before the American Bar Ass’n Antitrust
Section: How History Informs Practice (Nov. 19, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/
031120comppolicy.pdf.
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The antidote to case-centrism is a better awareness of the determinants of effective
competition policy. Recent developments in the academic literature and public policy
display a growing recognition of the role that institutional design and capability play in
shaping the quality of government competition programs.92 A virtue of the OECD
assessment project is its recognition that the “outputs” of competition agencies are not
generated spontaneously. Instead, outputs come into being only through a combination of
managerial choices and operational procedures. Projects that encourage agencies to
strengthen the quality of inputs have true promise to raise the quality of outputs. Over
time, good technique tends to beget good results.
The second potential contribution of the project is the creation and assembly of a
substantial base of knowledge about how competition agencies might best answer basic
and recurring questions about how to structure, manage, and operate an institution. The
creation and refinement of a commonly accepted standard for process-oriented evaluation
would facilitate the analysis of individual jurisdictions and permit extensive comparisons
across jurisdictions. If the project ultimately engages a large number of competition
agencies, each participant will have a common frame of reference with which to discuss
key operational and organization issues with its peers and a large base of experience with
which to inform its own decisions.
In January 2005, the competition agency of Portugal agreed with OECD that
Portugal would serve as the jurisdiction for prototyping the project. From January
through April, representatives of the OECD collaborated with the Portuguese
Competition Authority in applying the assessment tool. An initial summary of the results
of the project was presented by Paul Maylon, an OECD consultant and a principal
architect of the project, and officials from the Portuguese Competition Authority at the
June 2005 Evaluation Roundtable of the OECD.
V. CONSTRUCTING A METHODOLOGY FOR CONDUCTING PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
This Part proposes methodologies that competition agencies might consider in using
ex post assessments to derive insights about the substance and process of policymaking.93
It is worth acknowledging at the outset the reasons why competition agencies might be
disinclined to spend resources in evaluating the effects of completed interventions or
operational procedures. An evaluation might not find that the agency has achieved
favorable results. For example, the evaluation might reveal that specific enforcement
initiatives either had no effect or yielded perverse results. A competition agency
understandably might hesitate to undertake research that casts doubt upon the wisdom of
its past actions and, perhaps, raises questions about current enforcement programs.
As suggested above, concern that the application of performance measurement
techniques might unmask, and possibly make transparent to external observers, an
agency’s miscalculations about the value of specific interventions is not a sound basis for
92. Kovacic, supra note 10, at 864-65 (recognizing that antitrust standards must remain attuned to the
continually changing global economy); Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission
and the Future Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 399 (2003) (noting
and addressing the challenges facing the FTC in making competition policy).
93. See KUSEK & RIST, supra note 3 (discussing how public institutions can design and implement
evaluation methodologies).
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dispensing with evaluation. There may be instances in which a government agency
properly might withhold information about frailties or vulnerabilities in its operations out
of concern that disclosure might assist outsiders in frustrating the attainment of important
national goals.94 Competition policy, by contrast, is more likely a field in which fuller
disclosure and analysis of outcomes will stimulate public discussion that serves over time
to improve the quality of competition policy. The social benefit of performance
measurement in correcting enforcement or process weaknesses or channeling resources
toward activities with the strongest contributions toward improving consumer welfare
outweigh the immediate costs of reputational discomfort to the competition agency.
A second possible impediment to developing and applying performance
measurement techniques is expense. To fund evaluations, a competition agency must
spend resources that otherwise might be made available for the development of new cases
and for the fulfillment of mandates imposed by law, such as the review of proposed
mergers. As discussed above, expenditures for evaluation help insure that outlays for
substantive programs are well spent. Evaluation helps inform the competition agency’s
decision about what to do next—just as navigation informs a captain’s judgment about
how to handle a ship. Without some dedication of resources to ex post evaluation, it is
doubtful that a competition agency can have confidence that its enforcement programs
are achieving appropriate ends, especially where the initiative in question, such as the
proper approach to merger analysis in technologically dynamic sectors, can rely heavily
on untested intuitions about the effects of intervention. Even where there is broad
consensus about the social value of applying the substantive command, such as a
prohibition against supplier cartels, ex post evaluation can identify ways in which a
competition agency can improve its enforcement of the command. For these reasons, a
routine allotment of funds for evaluation activities should be part of the competition
agency’s annual budget.
A third and more serious obstacle involves the design of the performance
measurement process. Evaluating the effects of individual prosecutorial decisions can
present difficult measurement and data collection issues. To decide that an agency ought
to assess the quality of its organization and operational procedures does not indicate
exactly how the assessment should be performed.
One response to this concern is that even simple analytical models supported by
limited data promise to provide a more confident basis for policymaking than many
competition authorities currently possess. The exercises undertaken by the EU and the
United States to evaluate the implementation of merger remedies in one sense have
involved relatively simple analytical techniques. The agencies have not sought in these
exercises to measure the actual competitive impact of divestitures. Instead, DG Comp and
the FTC have employed simple but informative methods to test their assumptions about
the likelihood that a purchaser of divested assets would deploy those assets to compete in
the relevant market. The effort to determine whether divested assets remained in the
market and were used to compete against the merging parties gave the competition

94. In the context of discussing information security issues see Peter Swire, A Model for When Disclosure
Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and Network Security?, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
163 (2004) (providing a highly informative model for analyzing when the disclosure of information about a
system is likely to set in motion developments that increase or decrease the security of the system).
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agencies considerably valuable information about the design of future merger remedies.
The balance of this Part provides a second response to concerns about methodology
by proposing approaches that competition agencies might take to design new
performance measurement systems or to enhance existing programs for ex post
evaluation. This Part analyzes methodology issues that affect the design of case-specific
evaluations and process-oriented evaluations alike, and highlights concerns that relate
specifically to each form of performance measurement.
A. Constructing an Evaluation Methodology
A competition agency considering the establishment or enhancement of a
performance measurement system faces at least three basic methodological issues. First,
how should it go about framing methodological options and identifying superior
evaluation techniques? Second, should the agency use its own employees to conduct the
evaluation exercise, or should it enlist the participation of outsiders? Third, should the
agency disclose the results of its evaluation exercises only to its own personnel, or should
the outcome of the assessments be made available in some form to audiences outside the
agency? Each issue is considered below.
1. Choosing a Process for Designing a Performance Measurement Methodology
The process for designing a case-specific or process-oriented performance
methodology should involve contributions from competition policy insiders and
outsiders. Agencies should envision the planning process as having four elements,
described below.
a. Preliminary Discussions within the Competition Agency
The first element of the planning process should include internal discussions with
the competition agency’s management team to establish a consensus, in principle, for
carrying out a performance measurement exercise and to identify a bureau within the
agency that will be responsible for measurement projects. Many agencies have found that
an appropriate location for this responsibility is an office dedicated largely to policy
analysis functions. The initial intramural discussions should be informed by the agency’s
own initial reading of the literature on performance measurement for competition
agencies. A policy office within the competition agency is a natural candidate to perform
the literature survey.
b. Consultations with Expert Outsiders
The second key element in designing a methodology is the consultation of expert
outsiders. This consultation can be done in a variety of ways. One approach tested in a
number of jurisdictions is for the agency to consult a relatively small group of expert
outsiders who are chosen for their familiarity with the issues posed by the form of
evaluation the agency has in mind. In planning a case-specific evaluation project, the
agency should consult industrial organization economists with experience doing
empirical work. This was the methodology that the FTC followed in the late 1970s when
it gave contracts to Richard Caves and Ben Klein to draft protocols to guide its
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assessment of vertical restraints and abuse of dominance cases. In preparing a processoriented review, the agency should seek advice from experts who are intimately familiar
with the management and operation of a competition agency, as well as experts with
extensive experience in conducting performance management reviews for public or
private institutions.
A second repository of external expertise that ought to be tapped in this initial
exploratory phase of planning is other competition authorities. As suggested in this
background Article, competition agencies have accumulated valuable experience with
performance measurement. Discussions with competition agency officials who have
conducted such evaluations are a valuable and necessary element of initial preparation.
The materials contained here and the country contributions to be presented at the OECD
session provide a starting place for identifying the relevant competition agency personnel.
A third source of expertise external to the competition agency consists of other
government institutions with experience in performance measurement. Increased concern
in recent decades with improving the performance of public agencies has generated a
number of innovations for assessing the quality of agency management systems and
specific substantive outputs.95 Within any single jurisdiction, a variety of government
agencies other than government bodies traditionally associated with auditing functions
may have valuable experience in designing evaluation programs. The foregoing approach
to planning a performance measure exercise, which emphasizes consultations with a
comparatively small number of advisors, can be carried out in a relatively quiet and
nonpublic manner. A competition agency might prefer to begin with this low-key
approach as a means of identifying possibilities best suited to its own circumstances and
resources. This initial consultation phase by itself may provide the agency with a
confident basis for launching the evaluation exercise without further steps to identify and
vet options for performance measurement.96
A competition agency could decide to engage in a more elaborate planning process
that supplements the low-key and nonpublic consultation between competition agency
staff and small numbers of expert outsiders. The more elaborate process could include
issuing a preliminary project description, work plan, or simply posing methodology
issues for public comment. A still more robust form of public involvement would be to
host a public conference, seminar, or workshop to gather the views of academics,
practitioners, business officials, consumer groups, and other government officials about
the appropriate design and substantive focus of an evaluation exercise. Where the
competition agency is uncertain about the resolution of technical issues, the public
workshops also can be an occasion for eliciting commentary about the results of previous
efforts by competition agencies to conduct performance assessments.

95. KUSEK & RIST, supra note 3.
96. For example, the World Bank has established a “Measuring Results” project that uses ex post
assessments to evaluate the implementation of law reform initiatives and other development related measures
that have received assistance from the Bank. A description of the Bank’s Measuring Results project is available
at http://www.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/projects.
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c. Budgeting
The initial planning phase is an appropriate occasion to begin formulating a budget
for the evaluation exercise. For the better funded competition agencies, good practice
would dictate that some funds be earmarked annually for performance measurement. For
the reasons described earlier in this paper, the agency should progress toward a norm that
encourages the inclusion of some outlays for performance measurement in each budget
cycle.
For poorly funded agencies that struggle unsuccessfully to satisfy even the most
urgent operational needs, two possibilities come to mind. One is to rely on regional
cooperation and regional associations to serve as focal points for the planning and,
possibly, the execution of performance measurement exercises. This is one of a number
of areas in which regional bodies can facilitate the pursuit of institution-building projects
that might exceed the capabilities of any single competition agency. The second
possibility is to approach donor agencies to seek subsidies for evaluation exercises. In
recent years, national and multinational donors have given increased attention to
performance measurement, and there is reason to believe that requests by competition
agencies would not simply be brushed aside or deferred to infinity or beyond.
d. Identifying Restrictions on the Use and Dissemination of Confidential Records
The initial planning process should address restrictions on the use of confidential
data in the performance management exercises, both the proprietary business records in
the competition agency’s possession and the confidential work product (such as
memoranda prepared by professional staff and sensitive internal decisionmaking records)
of the competition agency itself. Most, if not all, competition agencies will need to
consider whether and with what conditions confidential records can be provided to
agency outsiders who will participate in the evaluation exercises, and what restrictions
must be observed in any public release of the results of an evaluation exercise. A further
issue for some jurisdictions is whether the work product of the evaluation exercise itself
must be revealed pursuant to the disclosure requirements of various public records
statutes. For these and related questions, the initial process of planning an evaluation
program ordinarily draws upon the advice of the agency’s legal services department.
Experience in individual jurisdictions is likely to vary, but some general
observations about the treatment of confidential records are possible. Most jurisdictions
have mechanisms for permitting outside experts to gain access to confidential records
upon signing nondisclosure agreements. The typical nondisclosure agreement forbids the
outsider from revealing confidential information to specified categories of individuals,
unless the competition agency expressly authorizes the disclosure. The nondisclosure
agreement also permits academics and other commentators to write about the project, but
requires that the author give the competition agency drafts of manuscripts to ensure that
confidential information has not been disclosed. Competition agencies that have
published their own reports or papers on evaluation exercises also have found effective
mechanisms to supply informative accounts of their results without disclosing business or
other information that must be kept secret.
The preservation of confidential data is another area in which competition agencies
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have assembled considerable experience. An agency planning its first evaluation exercise
can consult its peer organizations for advice about how to manage the flow of
information used in and generated by an evaluation program. It is quite likely that
agencies experienced in performing evaluation exercises can provide templates of
nondisclosure agreements or supply descriptions of safeguards used to ensure that
confidentiality obligations are observed.
2. Conducting Ex Post Assessments: Using Insiders, Outsiders, or Both
One evaluation methodology would rely solely on the competition agency’s own
personnel to conduct evaluations. The agency would establish a process for its own
personnel to select completed enforcement initiatives (both litigated cases and consent
agreements) or operational procedures and analyze their quality. For example, a casespecific evaluation would consist of having agency personnel review specific
enforcement episodes in detail, studying the deliberative processes that led to the
agency’s intervention, interviewing those involved in the decision to prosecute, and
collecting data on effects, such as by consulting customers or competitors of the
respondents. Internal self-evaluation could be performed as a collaborative effort between
case handlers, economic units, and policy bodies.
As suggested above, there are considerable advantages to engaging the talents of
expert outsiders in performing assessments and not simply in the design of the
measurement process. When they conduct or contribute to the actual assessment, an
outsider can provide an expert perspective that the agency itself does not possess and can
make the assessment more objective by bringing a presumably neutral point of view to
the exercise. The outsiders could be nongovernment employees working under contract to
the competition agencies, or could be employees of government institutions, such as
national audit offices that occasionally examine competition agencies.
The level of participation by outsiders could range from more expansive forms of
involvement, such as performing case studies, to more limited contributions, such as
offering comments on studies prepared by agency insiders. Compared to relying solely on
insiders, participation by outsiders also is likely to increase the exercise’s credibility in
the eyes of external groups. Even if an audit is not made public in any form, the agency
probably will obtain a more meaningful perspective on its work if it engages outsiders on
a confidential basis to participate in preparing the audit or commenting on reports that
present the results.
One recent example that warrants attention by competition agencies is the
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) project mentioned in Part III.F
above. In this project, the Canadian government is funding research by scholars in seven
developing countries97 to identify and analyze factors that impede competition in the
private sector of their economies. One important dimension of the IRDC study is the
examination of how interventions by competition policy agencies in these countries have
affected economic performance. To perform the country studies, the IRDC project
director, Simon Evenett, has recruited a team of scholars in each developing country.
Drafts of some country studies have been completed, and the project’s aim is to make the

97. The nations are Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Mexico, and South Africa.
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studies and data sets assembled available to other scholars and analysts.
One could imagine a collaboration in which a competition agency canvassed
existing case-specific evaluation research within its own borders and sought to form a
partnership with the organization conducting the research. For existing or proposed
projects of this type, the competition agency might offer its cooperation to the outside
researchers, including access to agency personnel and discussions about publicly
available information of which the outside researchers might not be aware. A still less
drastic form of productive involvement would have the competition agency host or
participate in conferences in which the results of such research are presented.
3. Disclosure of Results
One disclosure technique reveals the results of ex post assessments solely to
enforcement agency personnel. For some competition policy agency insiders, this
approach might seem to be the least threatening form of evaluation. If the findings are
negative, only the agency will be aware of them.98 An evaluation program by which the
competition agency performs assessments but limits disclosure of the results to its own
personnel is considerably better than no evaluation system at all. Even if an agency is
unwilling to reveal evaluation results to outsiders, its chances of identifying and
correcting flaws in case selection and procedure are likely to improve if it engages in a
purely intramural exercise of candid self-assessment. As the agency uses and applies its
internal evaluation methodology, it may become more comfortable over time in revealing
at least some information about its assessments to outsiders.
The alternative to purely in-house distribution is to make evaluation results public in
some form. The competition authority could issue public versions of the evaluations that
delete references to sensitive information, such as confidential business data or material
that discloses enforcement intentions regarding pending matters. A general presumption
favoring public disclosure is warranted as a means of improving the substance and
perceived legitimacy of a competition policy program, as well as the rigor of internal
decisionmaking. Even limited forms of public disclosure can elicit useful suggestions
from outsiders about improvements in the choice of interventions and procedure.
By its willingness to subject its operations and decisions to public discussion, the
competition agency can increase public confidence in the competition policy system. The
knowledge that the agency will engage in future public discussion about assessments of
its work could supply additional motivation to agency managers and professional staff to
carry out their responsibilities conscientiously.
Here it is useful to consider, again, the experience of the FTC with its study of
merger remedies in the 1990s. The FTC divestiture study underscores the benefits of
public disclosure.99 As noted above in Part IV.C.1, the merger remedies study was
conducted by FTC attorneys and economists, who consulted an outside academic about
the design and execution of the inquiry. After deleting references to confidential and
nonpublic information, the agency released the study to the public. The FTC remedies
98. Some jurisdictions may have public disclosure statutes that could require a competition agency to
make such assessments, or redacted versions of them, available if requested. The design of a purely internal
study would have to account for the types of information that might have to be revealed.
99. See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, supra note 63.
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study was both informative and influential. Had the FTC chosen to conduct the study
internally and make no public disclosure of its results, the exercise would have been
valuable for what it told the FTC about needed improvements in the design of remedies.
It is also clear that publication of the results stimulated a useful public debate about
merger remedies and served to inform other competition agencies about how to improve
merger control.
As a technique for disseminating the results of case studies and evaluations,
competition policy agencies might commit themselves to engage in the detailed public
analysis of specific cases or internal procedures that have been the subject of analysis by
agency insiders or outsiders. Discussions of individual cases and of internal procedures
that engage enforcement officials, private practitioners, business operators, and
academics would increase understanding of the motivations for and consequences of
individual enforcement decisions and agency procedures. Whether conducted in
seminars, workshops, or conferences, the public give-and-take provides useful feedback
to the competition agency and stimulates thinking about evaluation among external
constituencies. Experience with discussion and debate between competition agencies and
external groups concerning issues of doctrine and enforcement policy creates good reason
to expect that a dialogue on matters relating to performance management would yield
improvements in agency case selection and management.100
B. Special Considerations for Process-Oriented Performance Measurement
The central task for applying a process-oriented evaluation methodology is to define
what constitutes good internal agency procedures. Presented below is a suggested
beginning for a list of good practice characteristics by which the quality of a competition
agency’s management techniques and procedures might be tested.101
1. Mechanism for Strategic Planning
To be effective, a competition agency, be it old or new, must have a conscious
process for setting goals and creating steps to accomplish them. To do otherwise is to be
the passive captive of external demands, whether in the form of complaints from
consumers or business operators, or requests for action by public bodies. Even the most
humbly funded competition agency must develop a strategic plan that defines what it will
seek to achieve in the coming year or years.

100. See A. Douglas Melamed, International Antitrust in an Age of International Deregulation, 6 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 437, 444 (1998).
It is important to keep in mind . . . that antitrust in [the United States] is based, not on a political or
legislative code, but rather on a broad, general statute that has been sustained through what is
really a common law process—by which I mean, not only a process of federal court litigation, but
more broadly a dialog among academic and business communities, the enforcement agencies and
the courts.
Id.
101. The discussion in Part V.B is derived in part from William E. Kovacic, Achieving Better Practices in
the Design of Competition Policy Institutions, in ON THE MERITS & CURRENT ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW
AND POLICY 195 (Paul Lugard et al. eds., 2005).
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2. Maintenance and Disclosure of Databases
Each competition agency should prepare and provide a full statistical profile of its
enforcement activity. Good databases are indispensable to the tracking and analysis of an
agency’s activities over time. Despite their importance to performance measurement, the
maintenance and public disclosure of comprehensive and informative databases on
enforcement are relatively uncommon for competition policy agencies. Every authority
should take the seemingly pedestrian but often neglected step of developing and making
publicly available a database that (1) reports each case initiated; (2) provides the
subsequent procedural and decisional history of the case; and (3) assembles aggregate
statistics each year by type of case. Each agency should develop and apply a
classification scheme that permits its own staff and external observers to see how many
matters of a given type the agency has initiated and to know the identity of specific
matters included in the category of enforcement activity.
Among other ends, a current and historically complete enforcement database would
promote better understanding and analysis, inside and outside the agency, of trends in
enforcement activity.102 For example, access to such databases would give competition
agencies greater ability to benchmark their operations with their peers. For poorly funded
institutions, this is another area in which regional or global organizations can make
immediate and major contributions.
3. Explanation of Actions Taken and Not Taken
Competition agencies should take measures to progress toward a norm that favors
explanations for all important decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute. One might
define as “important” any matter in which a competition authority conducts an elaborate
inquiry. The norm suggested here would dictate that the agency seek as often as possible
to explain why it decided not to intervene following an extensive investigation.
4. Assessment of Human Capital
Continuous institutional improvement requires a competition agency to regularly
evaluate its human capital. The capacity of an agency’s staff deeply influences what it
can accomplish. An agency routinely must examine the fit between its activities and the
expertise of its professionals. Has the agency developed a systematic training regimen for
upgrading the skills of agency professionals? If the agency is active in areas such as
intellectual property that require special expertise, has it acquired the requisite specialized
skills by hiring some patent attorneys? Do government statutes and regulations that
control public sector employment permit the agency to recruit needed expertise in a
timely manner?

102. See generally Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365
(1970) (discussing a formative treatment of the value of good statistical records for the analysis of competition
policy).

[KOVACIC] FINAL

542

8/17/2006 10:14:45 AM

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Winter

5. Investments in Competition Policy Research and Development
An essential element of continuous institutional improvement is the enhancement of
the competition agency’s knowledge base. In many activities, particularly in conducting
advocacy, the effectiveness of competition agencies depends on establishing intellectual
leadership. To generate good ideas and demonstrate the empirical soundness of specific
policy recommendations, competition authorities must invest resources in “competition
policy research and development.”103 Regular outlays for research and analysis serve to
address the recurring criticism that competition policy lags unacceptably in understanding
the commercial phenomena it seeks to address.
6. Recognition of Policymaking Interdependencies
Increasingly, efforts to formulate effective competition policy will require
competition agencies to study more closely how other government institutions affect the
competitive process. Many jurisdictions resemble a policymaking archipelago in which
various government bodies other than the competition agency deeply influence the state
of competition. Too often each policy island in the archipelago acts in relative isolation,
with a terribly incomplete awareness of how its behavior affects the entire archipelago.
It is ever more apparent that competition agencies must use non-litigation policy
instruments to build the intellectual and policy infrastructure that connects the islands and
engenders a government-wide ethic that promotes competition. Building this
infrastructure requires competition authorities to make efforts to identify and understand
the relevant interdependencies and to build relationships with other public
instrumentalities. In a number of instances, the study of collateral government policies
will reveal how existing and proposed forms of public intervention impede competition.
The capacity to study and document the effects of such impediments and to undertake
advocacy initiatives to correct them will be important elements of an agency’s program.
On the report card we use to measure competition agencies, the suppression of harmful
public intervention should weigh just as heavily as the prosecution of a case that
forestalls a private restraint.
7. Benefits of Comparative Study
As suggested above, comparative study can play an informative role in improving
the performance of individual competition agencies.104 A competition agency should not
consider adjustments in its own organization, procedures, or management techniques
103. See Muris, supra note 92 (analyzing the concept of “competition policy research and development”
and its role in determining institutional capability); see also Akenori Uesugi, Where Japanese Competition
Policy is Going—Prospect and Reality of Japan, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 57, 76 (Barry
Hawk ed., 2005) (describing the Japanese Fair Trade Commission’s 2003 creation of the Competition Policy
Research Center to bolster its research capabilities).
104. See Wolfgang Kerber & Oliver Budzinski, Competition of Competition Laws: Mission Impossible, in
COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT 31, 36-40 (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 2004) (providing an excellent
review of the use of international benchmarking as a way to improve the competition systems of individual
jurisdictions, and for a less sanguine view than this Article holds of the potential net benefits of comparative
benchmarking).
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without examining experience abroad. Whatever the issue may be, whether analytical
methodology, investigative techniques, personnel policy, or advocacy, foreign practice
frequently has much to teach any competition authority.105
One criterion by which to evaluate a competition agency’s internal procedures is the
degree of attentiveness to, and analysis of, relevant foreign experience. The ready
availability in electronic form of foreign materials concerning many elements of
competition agency enforcement and operations facilitates the comparative analysis
contemplated here. Multinational organizations can spur this process by creating
databases that describe and collect the results of evaluation projects carried out within
individual jurisdictions.
C. Special Considerations in Case-Specific Evaluations
Past experience with the evaluation of specific competition agency interventions
suggests considerations that agencies should take into account in carrying out the
evaluation of cases or other actions.
1. Reviewing a Collection of Matters Rather than Analyzing Single Cases
An agency may learn more about its selection of cases or other inventions if it
studies several related matters rather than focusing on a single intervention. For example,
the FTC’s study of vertical restraints cases in the late 1970s and early 1980s examined a
range of matters within individual industries to develop a more general sense of the
impact of its resale price maintenance and nonprice vertical restraints enforcement
program.106 It may not always be possible to study several matters of a specific type, and,
as the FTC-sponsored study of the Xerox abuse of dominance settlement shows, the study
of an individual case can be highly useful. Nonetheless, the design of a case-specific
evaluation project should consider the possibility of studying two or more matters of a
specific type.
2. Understanding Enforcement Choices in Context
Good case studies demand the skills of the historian and political scientist no less
than the skills of an economist.107 Researchers conducting case studies should be pressed
to account for the context that motivated the decision to prosecute. In addition to
evaluating consequences ex post, a good case study should seek to recreate as much as
possible the ex ante assumptions that guided the agency’s decision to intervene. This is
particularly true for interventions that turn out to be ineffective or in some sense
105. See generally Kovacic, supra note 58 (describing what older competition authorities can learn from
institutional innovations undertaken by newer competition authorities); Sheridan Scott, Cartel Enforcement:
International and Canadian Developments, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 33, 41-48 (Barry
Hawk ed., 2005) (discussing the value of comparative analysis and international benchmarking in informing
Canada’s consideration of reforms to its competition statutes).
106. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (describing FTC vertical restraints evaluations).
107. See generally DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE:
PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (1998) (discussing the importance of history and political science as sources of
insight about the development of competition systems and as tools for understanding specific enforcement
measures).
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counterproductive. Agencies seldom engage in unsuccessful endeavors because they
enjoy failure or take pleasure in retarding social progress.
Commentators sometimes attribute the failure of an agency’s substantive
interventions to the irrationality, primitiveness, or general perversity of its incumbent
decisionmakers.108 This explanation often is a mistaken, intellectually lazy answer to the
question of why agencies fail. It ducks the harder and more perplexing question of why
intelligent individuals made choices that prove to be seriously ill-conceived. As one
scholar made the point: “Individual regulatory experiments and episodes must be judged
against a standard true to the particular historical moment.”109
A case study may reveal that an agency made a faulty decision because it relied
upon the wrong analytical model despite the availability of better models. One part of the
researcher’s task is to explain why the agency persisted in embracing the flawed model
and neglected superior alternatives. The researcher should be pressed to suggest what
types of institutional adjustments might serve to avoid being trapped on the wrong path in
the future. This type of analysis is possible only if the researcher declines to build and
demolish a strawman, and instead takes the ideas and institutional influences that guided
the competition agency at the time of the decision to prosecute on their own terms.
3. Sensitivity to Institutional Capabilities and Long-Term Consequences
One factor in assessing a decision to intervene is the care with which a competition
agency avoided serious mismatches between its institutional capability and the analytical
demands posed by the case. In some sense, a public institution always will be forced to
run at a level above its capacity. There is, however, a difference between trying to operate
at 105% of capacity and 200% of capacity. The first condition is manageable. The second
begets failure. Sensitivity to the longer term institutional demands associated with
initiating a new matter and effort to achieve a rough match between commitments and
capability ensure that incumbent managers do not impose significant negative
externalities on successors and on their agencies as a whole.
D. Case-Specific Evaluations: Building Mandates into Settlement Decrees
Courts sometimes have played an important role in promoting efforts to assess the
results of relief obtained in settlements. Since 1974, the federal district courts have been
required to approve antitrust settlements in cases prosecuted by the DOJ.110 One
provision of the settlement approved by Judge Harold Greene that resolved the
government’s monopolization claims in United States v. AT&T Co. required periodic
evaluations of the efficacy of the relief negotiated between AT&T and the DOJ.111 This
requirement generated informative assessments of the effects of the AT&T divestiture
and analyses of the need for continuing restrictions on the business operations of the
successors to the Bell Telephone system.112
108. See Kovacic, supra note 12, at 383-84 (collecting authorities).
109. THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 308 (1984).
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2000).
111. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 194-95 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom., Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
112. For an example of the evaluations produced to satisfy the requirements of the AT&T settlement, see
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The evaluation mandated by Judge Greene in AT&T in some ways resembled a
command that Judge Charles Wyzanski incorporated into the decree issued at the close of
the DOJ’s monopolization case in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.113 After
finding that United Shoe had engaged in illegal monopolization, Judge Wyzanski
imposed a number of controls on the defendant’s future conduct. Paragraph 18 of the
decree provided that ten years after the decree’s effective date “both parties shall report to
this Court the effect of this decree, and may then petition for its modification, in view of
its effect in establishing workable competition.”114 In the mid-1960s, Judge Wyzanski
conducted the review contemplated in the 1953 decree.115
The settlement in AT&T and the decree in United Shoe provide models that
enforcement agencies and courts might adopt for other antitrust settlements. To ensure
that the consequences of settlements, especially provisions of uncertain effect, receive
subsequent scrutiny, an enforcement agency or a court could mandate periodic review of
their effects. Where settlements are not subject to judicial approval, the competition
agency might use its administrative discretion to incorporate mandatory assessment
provisions in at least a sample of its orders. The certainty of occasional ex post review
would add discipline to the negotiation of settlement terms and increase the empirical
foundation for designing antitrust remedies in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1940 Walton Hamilton and Irene Till authored a gloomy assessment of the first
50 years of experience with antitrust enforcement in the United States. The two scholars
observed that “[t]he Sherman Act has been called a ‘charter of freedom’ for American
industry. Why has it not been a success?”116 Among other findings, they concluded that
future improvements would require the correction of various institutional flaws of the
U.S. competition agencies. In particular, Hamilton and Till criticized what they believed
to be the competition agencies’ preoccupation with bringing the next case without the
benefit of an internal management system that selected matters on the basis of continuing
industry analysis, used such analysis to frame effective remedies, and monitored
results.117
Since Hamilton and Till reviewed U.S. experience 65 years ago, competition
agencies have evolved considerably and have accomplished a great deal. Despite the
passage of time, their emphasis on the importance of sound institutional design and
operations as keys to the substantive success of competition agencies rings true today. In
HUBER, supra note 67.
113. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d per curiam, 347
U.S. 521 (1954).
114. Id. at 354.
115. Emphasizing that United Shoe’s market share fell from 85% in 1953 to 62% in 1964, Judge Wyzanski
rejected the government’s request that the company be split into at least two successor firms. United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 266 F. Supp. 328 (C.D. Mass. 1967). The Supreme Court later reversed Judge
Wyzanski’s ruling, stating that he lacked discretion to impose a divestiture in this instance. United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
116. Staff of S. Temporary Nat’l Econ. Comm., 76th Cong., Investigation of Concentration and Economic
Power: Antitrust in Action 4 (Comm. Print 1940) (written by Walton Hamilton and Irene Till).
117. Id. at 30-35.
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discussions of competition policy there is a natural tendency to focus on current issues of
doctrine and enforcement policy. These issues, after all, often have an immediate and
powerful intellectual appeal. Amid discussions about the pressing substantive issues of
the moment, it is easy to lose sight of the practical questions that beset efforts to
formulate and execute competition policy programs. How should an agency set priorities?
What is the best way to organize the investigation and litigation of cases? Which internal
quality control mechanisms work best?
The exercises of preparing performance measures and conducting evaluations
provide valuable tools for answering these critical questions about the administration of
competition policy. The assessment of outcomes of substantive interventions can
generate useful information about such basic matters, such as the choice of cases and the
design of remedies. The routine evaluation of internal procedures supplies regular
opportunities to determine whether the agency’s organizational infrastructure and
management techniques put the competition authority in the best possible position to
select promising substantive initiatives and bring them to a successful close. A
competition policy system is only as good as the institutions entrusted with its
implementation.118 By emphasizing internal review and improvement, a competition
agency puts proper emphasis on the expansion of its knowledge base and institution
building as indispensable predicates to success.
Evaluations may indicate needed adjustments in the competition agency’s statutory
authority. In recent decades, many competition authorities have sought and obtained
important enhancements in the framework of laws, and there is every reason to believe
that a key to effectiveness over time will be the installation of periodic upgrades to
account for past experience and new conditions.119 A program of performance
measurement and evaluation can supply a better empirical foundation for designing and
justifying needed changes.
Evaluation promises to play a larger role that extends well beyond a competition
authority’s intramural decisions about case selection and management. The legitimacy of
government efforts to enforce competition policy commands depends substantially on the
ability of competition policy authorities to demonstrate to a variety of external observers
(e.g., legislators, business managers, and the public at large) that chosen forms of
intervention to curb restraints on business rivalry improve economic performance.
Neither the intuitions of public enforcement officials nor the hypotheses of academic
theorists are likely to provide a confident basis for outsiders to conclude that the
118. See Jean-Jacques Laffont, Competition, Information, and Development, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK
CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIES 237 (Boris Pleskovic et al. eds., 1999) (describing how the quality
of implementing institutions determines the success of a competition policy system); Timothy J. Muris,
Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 176 (2005) (discussing institutional
characteristics, including investments in “competition policy research and development,” that improve a
competition agency’s prospects for success).
119. See, e.g., PHILIP CLARKE & STEPHEN CORONES, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 8-16 (1999) (describing modern reform of Australia’s competition system); Paul Collins & Jeffrey
D. Brown, National Antitrust Laws in a Continental Economy: A Comparison of Canadian and American
Antitrust Laws, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 495 (1997) (reviewing the enhancement of Canada’s competition laws in the
1980s and their subsequent implementation); Kris Dekeyser & Celine Gauer, The New Enforcement System for
Articles 81 and 82 and the Rights of Defence, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY (Barry Hawk ed.,
2005) (describing the new EU framework for enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty).
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government agency has selected the correct mix of policies or chosen the ideal
procedures to execute programs. Competition policy institutions face a continuing need to
justify their value, and one cannot expect critical observers to be satisfied with only
unsubstantiated assurances of efficacy.120
Larger multinational bodies, such as ICN, OECD, and UNCTAD, and smaller
regional associations have taken promising steps to promote the formulation and
application of performance measures. Case seminars and peer review exercises have been
important sources of evaluation, and the regular meetings of these bodies have supplied
useful venues for individual agencies to share know-how about the results of their own
evaluation efforts. Considerable work remains to encourage competition agencies to
accept a norm that treats evaluation as a vital tool for ensuring that government
competition programs achieve desired ends. In the past, the evaluation initiatives of the
major international competition policy institutions have focused on performing
evaluations for their members. The focus for the future has to shift more toward projects
that assist and prod competition agencies to devise and apply their own performance
measurement methodology.
Ex post evaluation of results is important for all institutions, but it is especially
critical for competition agencies. Competition policy relies heavily on experimentation
and evolutionary adjustment to ensure that doctrine and enforcement policy make
defensible distinctions between benign and dangerous commercial practices. Even for the
most experienced and self-assured competition agency, competition policy is a work in
progress, and performance measurement provides a vital element of the process by which
agencies test new techniques and adapt proven methods to new circumstances. The
aphorism often applied to the growth of individuals rings true in this field of public
policy: It is what you learn after you know it all that really counts.

120. See KATZMANN, supra note 37, at 205 (“[W]ithout studies indicating whether antitrust policy is
technologically capable of achieving various economic goals, government is vulnerable to the charge that
antitrust is a charade or a lightning rod that absorbs the frustrations of those who might otherwise push for
greater state intervention in the economy.”).

